The US Congress and decision-making on war: Debates on war powers in the separation of powers system

Abstract:

Debates on the war-making powers of the US Congress and the President have been topical of late. President Barack Obama’s actions in relation to Libya (2011), Syria (2013), and more recently the 'targeted' actions against ISIL in Iraq and Syria, have raised discussions about the powers of the President as the Commander-in-Chief vis-à-vis the powers of Congress. If and when should the President seek congressional authorization for the use of US armed forces?

This Working Paper argues that Congress has constitutionally established but contingently manifest powers when it comes to decision-making on war. To examine this, the paper explicates the procedures of congressional involvement in the decision-making process on war and illustrates congressional debates on the war powers between the branches of government. The recent cases of Libya and Syria are examined in more detail to indicate the (aspired) role of Congress.

The powers between the branches of government are not static but rather (re)interpreted and (re)defined in different political contexts. War powers are one example to explicate the constitutional powers of the US Congress and the President that are divided, and to examine how these powers are considered and debated.

The Working Paper also explicates the role of Congress in the broader perspective. Concepts such as collective judgment, popular sovereignty and separation of powers are used in this context to indicate the role of Congress in this field.