Reassessing the Accountability of European Union Decentralized Agencies: Mind the Independence Gap

European Public Law is an English language journal edited at the Institute of European Public Law at the Law School, Hull University. A forum for the discussion of issues in the development of public law, the journal traces the public law of the Member States as it is shaped by the law of the European Union as well as by the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Human Rights.

European Public Law provides a detailed analysis of constitutional and administrative law at a crucial stage of European integration and legal development. In its articles, authorities in the field investigate the extent to which the separate systems of public law in each Member State are, notwithstanding their distinct historical and cultural backgrounds, developing a European Public Law in tandem with the law of the European Union Treaty. The journal also examines the public law systems of new Member States.

Without neglecting the more traditional concerns of constitutional and administrative law, the journal explores the emerging constitution of the European Union and the interplay between law and politics. It is concerned with the identification, examination and control of public power as public and private become ever more intertwined. Public law is given a wide interpretation, including the structure of government, judicial review, the conduct of regulatory bodies, redress of grievance through ombudsmen and administrative bodies, protection of human rights and protection against discrimination, openness and transparency, fiscal and monetary policy, and the role of regulation in the contemporary state and the European Union.

In short, the journal embraces the operation and control of government and government agencies, regulation of economic and commercial affairs and relationships between the state and individuals.This article examines two recent developments to ensure accountability and independence of the European Union (EU)’s decentralized agencies: the ‘Common Approach’ adopted by the EU’s political institutions, and the European Securities and Markets Authority (ESMA) judgment on the validity of the rules delegating extensive power to an EU agency. The article argues that first of all, the Common Approach strengthens the accountability and independence of EU agencies, yet it is not being sufficiently implemented and as such it fails to mitigate the accountability and independence deficits inherent in EU agencies. Secondly, it argues that ESMA strengthens the independence of the EU’s financial authorities at the expense of failing to address the existing accountability problem. On the whole, these developments are disappointing and fall far short of ensuring a coherent and effective system for safeguarding the agencies’accountability and independence.