The Paradox of Power Asymmetry: When and Why Do Weaker States Challenge US Hegemony?

All Azimuth: A Journal of Foreign Policy and Peace

All Azimuth, journal of the İhsan Doğramacı Peace Foundation’s Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research at Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey. It provides a forum for academic studies on foreign policy analysis and peace research as well as theoretically-oriented policy pieces on international issues.

It particularly welcomes research on the nexus of peace, security and development. It aims to publish pieces bridging the theory-practice gap; dealing with under-represented conceptual approaches in the field; and making scholarly engagements for the dialogue between the 'centre' and the 'periphery'. We strongly encourage, therefore, publications with homegrown theoretical and philosophical approaches. In this sense, All Azimuth aims to transcend the conventional theoretical, methodological, geographical, academic and cultural boundaries. All Azimuth is published two times a year by the Center for Foreign Policy and Peace Research.Little is known about how, among weaker states, incentives to challenge the status quo are related to the expected response of the US as the system’s hegemon. In contrast to conventional wisdom that suggests militarized punishment can deter potential challengers, it is argued that weak but strongly motivated challengers can interpret the hegemon’s military intervention against adversaries as a window of opportunity to launch their own actions.

Empirical results using Generalized Estimating Equations (GEE) and binary time-seriescross-section (BTSCS) models reveal that weaker states possess incentives to challenge the international status quo when the hegemon is preoccupied with prior foreign policy commitments, most notably war. In other words, weaker states dissatisfied with the status quo are more likely to challenge the hegemon when it is preoccupied with prior military commitments. They do so because war involvement distracts the hegemon, drains its capabilities and resolve, and opens up a window of opportunity for weaker states to issue challenges. In addition, weaker states that have an alliance portfolio dissimilar to that of the hegemon are more likely than others to initiate Militarized Interstate Disputes.

Theoretically, this paper provides microfoundations to answer the question of why weaker parties instigate asymmetric conflicts when it might seem irrational to do so.

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