Democratic commitments are not always credible: Abortion and German reunification

Abstract:

Can states make credible commitments to respect concessions they make as part of national reunification agreements? German leaders negotiating reunification in 1990 had to reconcile West Germany’s more restrictive abortion policy with East Germany’s more permissive one, and agreed in 1990 to a compromise that seemed to preserve first-trimester abortion on demand in the Eastern states. By 1993, however, that compromise had been undone and the formerly West German policy prevailed throughout the country. This history challenges the theory that commitments made by democratic regimes are credible, especially since there were a number of international and domestic factors present in this case that other scholars have identified as enhancing credibility.

We investigate the trajectory of unification-era German abortion policy and make two arguments: the decision by West German leaders to undo their earlier concessions was conscious rather than accidental, and despite Western attempts to reach a compromise that Easterners would see as credible the prevailing view in the East during the negotiations was that the Western commitment was uncertain at best. We conclude with some broader speculation about reunification, and suggest that promises made by a larger partner during negotiations over national reunification have inherent credibility problems that democratic institutions cannot by themselves solve. This implies that future reunifications, for example between North and South Korea or China and Taiwan, may be even more difficult to negotiate than currently recognized.