Understanding the social construction of the democratic deficit in CSDP: a Foucauldian approach

Abstract:

Drawing upon the Foucauldian approach of governmentality, this article argues that the democratic deficit of the EU's Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) is the outcome of how governmental power flows in CSDP governance and more precisely within the governance practices of the policy. To support this argument, the narrative explores the secrecy/confidentiality, informality and normalisation of the exercise of governmental power in a concrete example of CSDP governance, the recent pooling and sharing initiative. The example shows that the official makers of CSDP pursue efficiency of governance to the detriment of the democratic quality of the policy, and this is related with the productive and expansive rationality of governmental power flowing in and between the EU institutions. Despite the fact that governmentality usually links to structural explanations, allowing limited space for the role of agency in politics, the article concludes with reflections on how the political agency of the governing EU political subjects contributes to the social construction of the democratic deficit of CSDP.