Party choice and the Common European Sales Law, or: How to prevent the CESL from becoming a lemon on the law market

This article forms part of a special edition of the Common Market Law Review.

Publishers Abstract:
The aim of this contribution is to show the potential and limits of a choice for the Common European Sales Law (CESL) by the contracting parties. The author's main question concerns on what conditions it is dependent whether parties will choose for the CESL or not. An answer to this question cannot be given without a view of at least two things. First, people need to establish that there is added value in the creation of an optional European regime compared to traditional jurisdictional competition.

Second, it is important to establish what an optional contract regime should look like if it is to develop as an attractive competitor on the law market. This question requires knowledge of what it is that contracting parties maximize when they decide upon the legal design of their contract, leading to an assessment of the proposed CESL and to possible ways to remedy its defects.