Republican liberty and compulsory voting

During the recent financial crisis, German public banks dominated the headlines. Their surprisingly deep involvement can be attributed to the liberalization of the German public banking system by the European Commission. The success of the proponents of the liberalization is notable because the Member states never intended for European law to have enough leverage to alter core elements of national financial systems. How could the Commission prevail over fierce national resistance and impose the primacy of European competition law over areas formerly exclusively subjected to national regulations? This paper examines why the supranational dynamic is superior to the intergovernmental logic. During the conflict over the liberalization of German public banks, the Commission combined its legal competences with political strategies that aimed at diverging interests within the coalition of defenders. Thus, the Commission not only shifted the default position of the defenders but also disunited their ranks: Formerly irrelevant differences of interest become relevant, the previously united coalition of defenders breaks up. The case illustrates how the Commission is able to impose its political preferences even against the will of the Member States.