Author (Person) | Leuffen, Dirk |
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Series Title | West European Politics |
Series Details | Vol.32, No.6, November, 2009, p1140-1160 |
Publication Date | November 2009 |
ISSN | 0140-2382 |
Content Type | Journal | Series | Blog |
Abstract: This article analyses French European policy-making in the context of divided government, arguing that in the area of European policy-making cohabitation increases the number of veto players, as compared with unified government. The increase of veto players, in turn, reduces France's acceptance-sets at the European table and thereby introduces a status quo bias. In order to test this theory, use is made of a comparative case study design. Process-tracing and counterfactual analyses reveal that veto player theory can, indeed, be applied to the interactions of a split-executive government. |
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Source Link | http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/ |
Countries / Regions | France |
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