Gordon Brown’s Polish streak (and vice versa)

Two big puzzles in Europe are what the UK will be like under Gordon Brown and how to deal with Poland under the Kaczynskis.

There are striking similarities. Both the putative British leader and the current Polish ones - Lech (president) and Jaroslaw (prime minister) - are brooding, mistrustful figures, prone to obsessions and with notable blind spots about Europe.

Brown’s distaste for meetings with his European Union counterparts is legendary. Asked by his officials "would you like to meet the new German finance minister?" he once replied, with plangent honesty: "No."

These days he rarely turns up to EU meetings, preferring to send a deputy. When he does go - for example when the UK was president of the European Union - he is apt to read a prepared statement larded with pungent criticism of other countries and then sit fidgeting until the earliest possible moment when he can decently depart.

That sounds pretty much like the Kaczynskis’ approach to foreign affairs: identify the areas of disagreement, make a strong speech and hurry home. Both they and Brown dislike the fudge and mudge of multilateral negotiation, with its cynical exchange of favours and endless horse-trading. They detest professional diplomats.

The Kaczynskis, like Brown, prefer a tight circle of close advisers. They have a weakness for micro-management, but are willing to delegate in matters that do not interest them. Naturally shy, they are much nicer in private than in public.

The differences are in the areas of interest. The Kaczynskis are illiterate when it comes to economics; Brown thinks of little else (they share a dislike for the euro, though).

The Kaczynskis are minutely interested in security, intelligence and the criminal justice system; Brown has little time for soldiers, spooks or lawyers. Nobody knows what he thinks about Russia.

So far, Brown’s foibles have not especially damaged the UK’s standing in Europe. But the Kaczynskis have already damaged Poland’s.

The wholesale sackings of experienced but supposedly compromised senior officials, a series of cancelled meetings, unnecessary snubs and rows initiated by the Kaczynskis have all had regrettable effects.

A meeting of the EU’s ‘big six’ countries was called off with less than 24 hours notice - with the Italian and Spanish officials already in Warsaw. When a German newspaper insulted him, President Lech Kaczynski regarded it as a matter of state and sulked when no German official phoned to commiserate. From being a diplomatic power-house under the rule of sleazy but effective ex-communists, Poland has come close to being seen as a joke and a bad one at that.

That is unfair: the Kaczynskis’ basic interests in foreign policy are sound: they distrust Russia, are disappointed with Germany and see America as the ultimate basis for Poland’s security; they are convinced that energy supplies are not a matter just for business, but of national defence.

The problem has been turning principles into policies and actions: little has been done and even that poorly. At the end of 2005, the German Chancellor Angela Merkel suggested that Poland should join the Russian-German pipeline planned to go under the Baltic Sea. The response was immediate: Poland wanted not a bucket more of Russian gas, thank you very much.

That was bold, but in retrospect, a bad mistake. As a partner in the pipeline, Poland could have gained (and even leaked) information about the project’s curious financial arrangements (both concerning corruption and future profitability). It could also have asked for a share of the construction contracts.

Belatedly, the Kaczynskis are trying to make their foreign policy more effective. Perhaps they could give Brown some useful tips both about principles to adopt and mistakes to avoid.

• The writer is central and eastern Europe correspondent of The Economist.

Two big puzzles in Europe are what the UK will be like under Gordon Brown and how to deal with Poland under the Kaczynskis.