Germans flirt with Euroscepticism

Which leading EU politician said recently that people were running into the European Union's rules and regulations in more and more areas of their daily lives, citing rules on the internal market, environment and consumer protection, and energy consumption?

Who called for the "debureaucratisation" of the EU, saying that the amount of regulation was contributing to "so much scepticism" towards Europe? UK Finance Minister Gordon Brown? A free-market Baltic prime minister? No, it was German Chancellor Angela Merkel, speaking after the June European Council.

At the same time, Merkel's government is one of the most trenchant defenders of the EU constitution in its current form, insisting that the text must be preserved in full despite having been rejected by French and Dutch voters in last year's referenda.

This gulf between Germany's political ambitions and practical policies can also be discerned in a number of areas where Berlin is the major stumbling block to greater co-operation or an opponent of rules which are seen as overburdening industry.

Germany has played a central role in limiting the impact of the proposed REACH regulation on chemicals safety and testing while the coalition government, through its influence over the two biggest groups in European Parliament, was largely responsible for restricting the scope of the directive on liberalising the Union's services market. Looking ahead, Germany is strongly opposed to making it easier for member states to co-operate on fighting crime and terrorism by using the 'bridging' clause which enables laws to be passed with a qualified majority voting in the Council of Ministers, subject to approval from the Parliament.

Similarly, Merkel is reluctant to accommodate the Commission on the most important aspects of its proposed energy policy such as a pan-European energy regulator, infrastructure and the possibility of negotiating at EU level with supplier countries such as Russia.

One explanation for this gap between Berlin's political commitment to further European integration and policy positions dominated by national interests lies in the evolution of German public opinion in the last 10-15 years. The introduction of the euro was not universally supported in Germany. There was a widespread feeling that the single currency had allowed retailers to increase prices underhandedly - the so-called Teuro effect - a pun on the German for expensive. Germany's deteriorating public finances post-reunification also hardened public opinion against the country's traditionally generous funding of the EU budget. The German media, historically very supportive of the country's pro- Europeanism, has become much more critical, focusing on scandal and financial excesses in a pale imitation of the British press.

For Ulrike Guérot, senior transatlantic fellow at the German Marshall Fund in Berlin, the trend of mild scepticism towards the EU started at the end of Helmut Kohl's chancellorship in the late 1990s but received a boost with what she calls Gerhard Schröder's "Commission-bashing" after he came to power in 1998, taking a "French-style approach" to criticising the EU institutions on issues such as the Stability and Growth Pact's rules on public deficits.

Merkel's support for deregulation derives from German industry and owes something to long-standing protests from the LŠnder (German states) about their lack of say over EU legislation. Guérot attributes the recently emerged language to an attempt to accommodate increasing scepticism about European integration among blue collar workers who are losing out in the jobs market as a result of increasing competition at EU and global level. These losers, she argues, are attracted to left-wing groups such as Oskar Lafontaine's Left Party or right-wing populist groups such as Jean-Marie Le Pen's Front National.

The question facing all EU leaders and not just Merkel is how to deal with the losers from the economic transformation process. "If you have losers who make up 20-25% of the population you are putting the political system in danger," she says.

On the issue of energy, she sees no sign that Merkel is prepared to sacrifice Germany's strong position in the energy sector (with a strong negotiating position towards Russia) to subsume it within a wider European policy, as happened with giving up the Deutschmark for the euro.

According to Sebastian Kurpas, an analyst at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Merkel's language on deregulation and a commitment to European integration is not mutually exclusive. "More Europe doesn't mean more legislative output but better quality legislation through more use of impact assessments," he argues, pointing out that this is the agenda of very pro-integration members of the Commission.

He agrees that Berlin opposes using the bridging clauses on police and judicial co-operation not because of Germany's constitution, as officially claimed, but for "tactical reasons" to save as much of the EU constitution as possible in any future renegotiation of the treaty. Kurpas acknowledges, however, the sensitivity of giving up the veto in these areas, especially where migration is concerned.

While Merkel's language does not spell an outbreak of Euroscepticism among the political elite in one of the Union's traditionally most pro-integrationist members, it nevertheless indicates a necessary adjustment to changing political reality and increasingly critical public opinion. Expectations that the German presidency might make major concessions on justice and home affairs and energy for the sake of advancing European integration are probably ill-founded.

Which leading EU politician said recently that people were running into the European Union's rules and regulations in more and more areas of their daily lives, citing rules on the internal market, environment and consumer protection, and energy consumption?

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