Blue skies or perfect storm?

Late July - it's cooler in Istanbul than London, as a welcome breeze blows off the Bosphorus. But the EU debate in Turkey remains heated. The opinion polls show a dramatic decline in pro-EU support, tumbling from 70% in 2004 to 43% today. How did Turkey's 40-year EU dream turn sour so quickly, just as the door to negotiations had swung open?

"The EU smiles at us but it does not mean it," says a young Istanbul taxi-driver, "so the EU is only a dream. But we have everything we need here in Turkey." Many political experts agree, blaming anti-Turkey rhetoric in the EU, notably from Austrian and French politicians, for many Turks doubting EU sincerity in the negotiations process.

Atila Eralp, professor at Ankara's Middle East Technical University, says: "Turkey-sceptics in the EU have got stronger and their criticisms have increased in the past two years and that increasingly affects the debate in Turkey especially in the coming electoral period, so there's increasing Euroscepticism. And so the nationalists are benefiting on both sides, in the EU and Turkey".

When demands for recognition of Cyprus or for the opening of Turkish ports to Greek-Cypriot shipping are added, then the pot of Turkish resentment starts to boil over. No one thinks that Turkish Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan can or will open ports now.

Yasir Yakis, a leading member of parliament in the governing AK Party (AKP), says that while Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots made a positive move on Cyprus more than two years ago, they were not rewarded.

"The EU said, 'Please encourage the Turkish Cypriots to say 'Yes' [to the Annan plan]'...but when they voted in favour and the Greek Cypriots voted against, the party which rejected the plan was rewarded," he says. Yakis adds that: "We asked the EU what if the Turkish Cypriots say 'Yes' and the Greek Cypriots 'No'? They said 'don't worry, we will alleviate economic restrictions on northern Cyprus and will twist the Greek Cypriots' arms'." A western diplomat believes that "there's an enraged sense of justice" that the EU has failed to keep its end of the bargain.

Turkey's domestic political dynamics are also contributing to the breakdown of the EU-Turkey virtuous circle. Turkish nationalists are on a positive roll, cashing in on a burgeoning anti-western sentiment that has its roots both in growing anti-EU sentiment and anti-Americanism dating back to the start of the Iraq war in 2003.

Extreme nationalist lawyers have driven many high-profile recent cases against writers and journalists for insulting Turkishness (article 301 of the penal code). While the case against Turkish novelist Orhan Pamuk was thrown out, Armenian writer Hrant Dink recently received a suspended sentence.

Murat Belge, an academic and author, accused but acquitted under article 301, says: "There's a group of people from both within and outside the state who are against the idea of Europe because it's an idea that will change traditional structures in a very radical way... So 'denigrating Turkishness' trials create a very negative image of Turkey internationally but this is what they need. It's a quite sophisticated fight against Europe and anything democratic going on." He worries that Turkey is approaching a tipping point in its battle with these forces.

Ambassador Oguz Demiralp, Turkey's senior contact with the EU, says that "as a last resort amendment of 301 is not ruled out" but many doubt if Erdogan will do this in the current climate.

Both parliamentary and presidential elections are due next year, and this electoral cycle is also contributing to the breakdown of the pro-EU consensus and to a slowdown in reforms. For Atila Eralp, "In 2003-04, the pro-EU consensus was everywhere - civil society, business, opposition parties. Now we see a disintegration of that consensus, a fragmentation." Notably, the CHP, a social democratic opposition party, is becoming more nationalist and more anti-EU.

Many secularists and Kemalists are also alarmed at the idea that Erdogan - with his headscarved wife - may stand for president next May. Getting rid of the AKP rather than joining the EU seems to have become the top priority for some business and right-wing actors. According to one civil-society activist: "There's no hidden agenda in the AKP but a lot of powerful people and upper middle classes suspect there is, which is an impediment to [political] progress."

Meanwhile, the upsurge of violence in the Kurdish South-East is another factor promoting nationalism - and giving the military a stronger voice, as civilian and military funerals occur weekly. Many Turks fume at the US' refusal to allow the Turkish army to attack PKK positions in northern Iraq.

Despite a large lead in the polls, Erdogan's domestic and EU policy management is looking wobbly. In the face of growing nationalism, many think he is starting to play down the EU as an issue. The decision last year of the European Court of Human Rights to support the headscarf ban in Turkish universities was a blow to the AKP (which itself is a coalition of many different forces) and especially to many of its grassroots supporters.

Meanwhile, Ali Babacan, Turkey's chief negotiator, has a day job as economics minister. And where Turkish EU experts felt consulted by the government two years ago, the door is now closed. Even the government's own communications unit in its EU secretariat has been shut down, so there is no domestic EU communication strategy to reassure a nervous public.

As the widely predicted EU-Turkey 'train crash' over the opening of Turkish ports looms this autumn, it looks as if Turkey may face a 'perfect storm'. Faced with a critical and defensive EU, making demands that Turkey's government currently cannot deliver, and a domestic political scene that is fragmenting into short-run positioning for electoral gain, Erdogan faces a tough time in keeping both the Turkish and the EU shows on the road.

• Kirsty Hughes is an analyst based in London

Late July - it's cooler in Istanbul than London, as a welcome breeze blows off the Bosphorus. But the EU debate in Turkey remains heated. The opinion polls show a dramatic decline in pro-EU support, tumbling from 70% in 2004 to 43% today. How did Turkey's 40-year EU dream turn sour so quickly, just as the door to negotiations had swung open?