German foreign policy. Rebalancing, not realigning

How German foreign policy might change under a new government

IT COULD be Gerhard Schroder's last throw. Were the UN General Assembly next week to approve an expansion of the Security Council, making a permanent seat for Germany likely, this foreign-policy triumph would boost the chancellor's re-election campaign. But if the resolution fails, his rival, Angela Merkel, will be eager to exploit the occasion. Foreign policy is not one of her strong suits: the programme of her Christian Democrats (CDU), published this week, gives it a scant four pages out of 40.

In foreign-policy terms, Germany might be conceived of as an atom at the centre of a molecule that is Europe. To keep this structure stable, says Ulrike Guerot, of the German Marshall Fund, Germany must balance relations with France, its key ally in the European Union; with Britain, the other big EU country; with smaller EU members, with central Europe and with Russia, the giant to the east; and, overarching these, with America.

This balance was easier to strike during the cold war. Relations with the east were about deterrence; the only big question was whether relations with France or America mattered most. Officially, the old West Germany mostly refused to answer: it needed France for European integration. But in practice, America came first as the ultimate guarantor of German security. As for the rest, the Germans were willing to please by footing most European bills.

Even after unification, Germany's approach to foreign relations remained much the same, not least because Helmut Kohl stood for continuity. It took a new chancellor in 1998 and the war in Iraq in 2003 to shake things up. But far from following a pacifist path, as many expected, German foreign policy has become more Gaullist, combining new self-confidence with a fiercer defence of the national interest.

This is partly because foreign policy has fallen increasingly to the chancellor, to the detriment of his (Green) foreign minister, Joschka Fischer. The decision to send German troops into combat for the first time since 1945 as part of NATO's 1999 war in Kosovo may have been at least equally Mr Fischer's, who had to fight to carry his party. But what followed was mainly of Mr Schroder's making: strong opposition to the war in Iraq, close friendship with the French and Russian presidents, firm support for lifting the arms embargo on China - and the pursuit of a permanent Security Council seat.

Where does this leave the molecule model? Germany is no longer at the centre, but closer to France and to Russia, and farther from America. Ties to central Europe, Britain and other EU countries are looser. In general, Germany has become more of a free agent, moving independently and trying to be a heavyweight in its own right. The old structure of foreign policy thus seems increasingly outdated.

Most Germans approve of this shift, which explains why Mr Schroder is most popular for his foreign policy. Some 45% of Germans believe their country's influence has grown in the past ten years and 51% think they are liked, says a recent Allensbach poll. As for which country Germans want to co-operate with most, France (70%) is now ahead of America (63%).

The weakness of Mr Schroder's foreign policy has been less its substance than its style, argues Christoph Bertram, the outgoing director of the German Institute for International and Security Affairs. Germany, he says, needs to be more conscious of its pivotal role in holding together the EU, and to show more respect for the sensitivities of smaller members. Others say that Mr Schroder has too short-term a view of German interests in Russia and China, putting business before human rights. Still others criticise Germany and France, both weak economically, for trying to perpetuate their dominance of the EU.

The opposition promises to do better. Ms Merkel is not given to rash decisions. She is also no bleeding-heart European in the mould of Mr Kohl, who saw European integration as a matter of war or peace. Ms Merkel assesses it more in terms of German interests. Yet a Merkel government will rebalance rather than realign.

Ms Merkel and Wolfgang Gerhardt of the Free Democrats (FDP), her most likely foreign minister, are more Atlanticist than Mr Schroder. But they know the old close transatlantic relationship is gone, not least because most Germans are now so critical of America. Both also understand the central importance of Franco-German relations. A Chancellor Merkel may visit America first - but only after she has visited Paris well ahead of the election (indeed, a trip is planned next week). Bigger change is likely elsewhere. Ties with Britain may get stronger, because Ms Merkel likes Tony Blair and shares his views on economic reform. And, although (or perhaps because) Ms Merkel is fluent in Russian, she will give Mr Putin a harder time than Mr Schroder has. Smaller EU members will also get more attention, even if not as much as they did under Mr Kohl.

There are potential bones of contention. One is EU enlargement, in particular to include Turkey. The FDP does not exclude full membership, but the CDU doesn't want to go beyond a privileged Turkish partnership with the EU (a position that could also upset the Americans). Other controversies could arise over sending German soldiers abroad, about which the FDP tends to be sceptical. Yet the biggest fight will probably be over divvying up foreign-policy roles. Mr Gerhardt will not want Ms Merkel to dominate foreign policy as Mr Schroder has.

If the election produces a grand coalition, the next foreign minister may be a Social Democrat - though it is hard to see any of the party's leaders in the job. What many in Berlin dread most is that Edmund Stoiber, boss of the CDU's Bavarian sister party, the Christian Social Union (CSU), insists on being foreign minister. That would give him a top post, but let him stand above the political fray: it is easier to be popular as foreign minister than as, say, finance minister. Yet Mr Stoiber would hate the travelling, says one insider: “He doesn't even like to leave Bavaria.”

Would German foreign policy change under a CDU government under Angela Merkel? Major feature.

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