Turkey and the European Union. Now make Turkey’s case

On being European and different

AFTER two days and a night of unseemly horse-trading between Turks, Austrians and other Europeans, Britain's foreign secretary, Jack Straw, made bold claims for the deal he brokered this week. The start of entry talks between the European Union and Turkey, he said, marked an “historic day for Europe and the whole of the international community”.

His bleary-eyed triumphalism may yet prove premature. But the reverse of what he said is certainly true. It would have been an historic disaster if, 42 years after promising the Turks the possibility of entry, and ten months after giving a definite date for talks to begin, the Union had slammed the door in Turkey's face. That outcome would have been dreadful, both in its direct consequences and because of the opportunities lost.

Among the short-term results, Turkey's impressive but still fragile programme of economic and political reform could have slowed or worse. Those Turks - starting with Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the prime minister - who have invested in a European future would have been left horribly exposed. Worse, Muslims in Turkey and elsewhere would have concluded that Europeans bore a grudge against them because of their faith alone. This would have encouraged all those, from Osama bin Laden to the western world's religious far-right, who long for a clash between Islam and the historically Christian world.

It is also true that a chance now exists to achieve something vastly desirable. All sides will benefit hugely if what is best in Europe, including its tolerant, liberal-democratic tradition, can finally come together with what is best in Turkey - including the dynamism of a demographically young nation that makes Europe's heartland seem sluggish by comparison.

But reaching that goal will require hard work and political courage. It will also need a prudent openness to the possibility that somewhere in the process, one or other party (and it could well be the Turkish side) will conclude that the price is too high. That would be disappointing but not necessarily terrible - as long as the EU expects of Turkey only the same as it would of any other applicant.

In Turkey, people's enthusiasm for a European future has already waned in the face of the “rudeness” of potential partners such as France and Austria. How can it be, many Turks ask, that people in those countries do not see the obvious benefits of having them as members? If the Turks are to find their way to Europe, they will need to grow thicker skins.

For European politicians, the queasiness of many citizens about embracing another large, impoverished country is a hard, irreducible fact. In several European countries, far-right parties are doing well by playing on fears of Muslim immigration. The response of the EU's leaders to these realities may yet be statesmanlike, or opportunistic. But it is politics, not technicalities, that will finally decide Turkey's fate.

And the politics will be tough. All the arguments against incorporating the Turks seem obvious and, to some politicians, tempting. The case for keeping the doors open has to be reasoned through more carefully. The onus is on politicians to convince voters that making western Europe a sort of up-market gated community would be worse than useless: it would not protect existing job-holders, or keep desperate labour migrants out, or stem Europe's relative decline in the world economy. If politicians are responsible, they will also point out that trying to toughen the rules unreasonably for Turkey will not make that country go away, or reduce its importance, or slow the pace at which it is changing: it will simply increase the chances that Turkey will evolve in an unhappy direction, towards Muslim fundamentalism or militaristic nationalism.

The right sort of scepticism

At the same time, politicians should accept that one ground for Turco-scepticism is, in its own terms, perfectly sound. To the delight of some and the dismay of others, Turkey's presence will make it harder for any country or axis to play a dominant role in Europe. With 15% of the total population, the Turks will hardly take over the Union themselves; but their membership will deny preponderance to others.

So France's ex-president, Valery Giscard d'Estaing, is right to say that an EU including Turkey will be a looser grouping than some people desire. The Turks may well wreck things for any state or pair of states which still hope the EU as a whole will act as a mouthpiece for their own political, or geopolitical, ideas; or that the Union will turn into a super-state with one or two of its current members in charge.

But in fact, those dreams have been dashed already, and it was not the Turks, or even the party-pooping Brits, who destroyed them. Among the many messages delivered by French and Dutch voters when they rejected the Euro-constitution, one was certainly this: that there are still some fundamental questions - such as how to mix efficiency with fairness, or tolerance with responsibility - that cannot be settled by pan-European edict alone. And many would rather see a somewhat looser EU than have choices they abhor imposed on them from above.

So as politicians consider the arguments in favour of embracing Turkey, they might try this one: the Turks' aspiration to be “European but different” may yet give heart to people in other parts of the EU who are willing to participate in the Union, and abide by commonly-agreed rules, but not to sacrifice their own nations' distinctiveness. Such people are quite numerous, and Europe is the stronger for it.

Editorial discusses the challenges facing Turkey and the EU now that formal negotiations for Turkey to join have started, 3 October 2005.