Facing common challenges and obligations in the Western Balkans

Two MEPs discuss EU's policy on the Balkans

If the EU loses its focus on the Balkans, the reform process will stagnate and conflict could follow, says Henrik Dam Kristensen

Tanks and burning houses - these are the horrifying images that come into many people's minds when thinking about the Western Balkan region. Luckily these images are fading, being replaced by the hope of a brighter future. The EU plays a key role in ensuring that the dark images will remain in the past and that the people of the region can look forward towards a region of peace and prosperity.

For now the weapons are put aside, but the violence and internal conflict still lurk around the corner. In order to ensure the peace and stability in the region the long-term perspective of accession to the EU is vital. The hope of a future as a part of the Union is the key engine for change in the region. At the same time the EU is also the one external player which possesses the power to force the necessary reforms and the leverage to press for justice and reconciliation in this still very vulnerable region.

The rejection of the EU constitution by France and the Netherlands has, however, left the EU at a crossroads. The national leaders have called for reflection and debate. One of the key issues in this debate in many of the member states is drawing up the future borders of the EU. Could further enlargement leave the EU in such a state that it is no longer possible to secure social, economic and cultural cohesion?

Whether the EU's citizens want further enlargements or not, it is also clear that further steps for taking in any more members beyond the existing 25 and the two already agreed upon is not possible without substantial institutional reform.

This uncertainty about the future of the EU affects not only the Union itself, it can also have fatal consequences for the Western Balkan region. If the Balkans were to lose the perspective of EU integration the reform process could very well stagnate, with a rise in instability and conflict as a result. The EU therefore has to be very aware of how to handle the current situation in a way that demonstrates its continued commitment to enlargement in the long run.

At the same time the EU must also focus its effort in the Western Balkans in a way that stimulates cohesion within the region. Since the break-up of the former Yugoslavia the EU has given considerable support to overcoming conflict and securing economic and social reconstruction in the region.

This effort must continue and it is very important that it is based on a regional approach. Although each country in the Western Balkan region will be judged on its own achievements in terms of EU accession, it is vital that the countries of the region learn to address common challenges jointly.

A regional approach must focus on creating a common economic area that will attract foreign investors and on reducing ethnic inequalities, so taking away the reasons for future conflict and instability in the region.

The future of the Western Balkans is of course not in the hands of the EU alone. It is self-evident that the Balkan countries themselves must prove their commitment and willingness to make substantial reforms in the area of democracy, human rights, the fight against organised crime etc. Relations with the EU and the perspective of accession is thus only one of many pieces in the big puzzle of the future of the Balkans. But we must not forget that this one piece is still essential to make the rest of the puzzle fall into place.

• Danish Socialist MEP Henrik Dam Kristensen is a member of the Parliament's delegation for relations with South-East Europe.

To prevent Europe falling apart, the EU has to be resolute and ensure its policies are not misinterpreted, Zsolt Becsey

The fiasco of the French and Dutch 'No' votes on the EU constitution can be seen as expressions of visceral doubt by citizens of the 15 'old' member states about whether enlargement is compatible with such challenges as fostering competitiveness. If that is so, then only one thing can shift these doubts, further enlargement.

That is to say a quality enlargement, a selective and realistic approach from the EU instead of the political bargaining we have seen up to now.

It is clear that the Balkans will be the theatre for any new enlargement and the countries of that region have to pass a crucial test - along with the European Union itself.

The question is: can we prevent an enlarged Europe falling apart? Can we avoid creating a Europe in which in addition to today's second class members (the ten new member states) a third class emerges?

The forecast is bleak given the obvious selfishness of the 15 old member states, expressed in both financial and institutional terms (for instance, the dead EU constitution and the 1% ceiling on the EU budget requested by six old member states).

In this challenging situation, the position of the Balkans is very dubious. The heritage of the Balkan states, with the exception of Croatia, differs profoundly from that of the EU's member states.

Politically correct or not, their legacy from the Ottoman Empire is our contemporary reality: the specific interpretation of the role of the state, centralism, weakness in status of contracts, in the status of territories and their population. Theirs was an empire where ownership was provisional and where power could be interpreted only unilaterally as a homogeneous entity under one person's control. The people of the Balkans did not get accustomed to the mentality of subsidiarity, tolerance and diversity. Their experience was: if you do not dominate, others will dominate you.

This war-stricken neighbourhood still needs to be stabilised. The historic challenge of the 1990s has not been answered yet: still new entities and structures are come about - in 2006 the status of Kosovo and Montenegro is on the table.

The democratic transformation is not yet finished. Significant progress has been made in the building of state structures, but questions still remain about the role of the civil society, the integration of subsidiary entities and the rule of law in the field of property.

Yet Brussels cannot send out officials to control villages in the Balkans. The Balkans has to control itself on behalf of Brussels.

It should be reflected, at least in the EU's negotiations, that we need progress. We need the respect of other nations - intolerance prevails even in the Vojvodina region of Serbia where the indigenous Hungarians (the region was part of Hungary until 1918) are physically assaulted and persecuted because they are different. Intolerance prevails in Kosovo against both the Roma and the Serbs, because they are different.

Let us build Europe by restoring the prestige of Article 6 and 7 of the treaty also in the Balkans - democratic life, tolerance, respect for human rights. Only after those prerequisites are established can commercial concessions, easing the visa regime and legal, financial and political co-operation be granted.

In the Balkans the EU has to be resolute and - if necessary - it has to use concrete sanctions in different fields to ensure that the policy of Brussels does not become misinterpreted by the local political elite.

The worst scenario we could create for the region would be to integrate a country into the EU without it displaying the will to change its mentality and become European.

• Hungarian centre-right MEP Zsolt Becsey is a member of the Parliament's delegation for relations with South-East Europe.

Two MEPs discuss the EU's policy on the Balkans.