Suspend constitution talks to consult people

Date: 19/02/04

THERE are many arguments for concluding negotiations on the EU constitution as soon as possible, as it has been advocated by the European Parliament - this also appears to be the general inclination among the member states.

The draft constitution features a wide range of reforms that few can reasonably oppose and that may be of major importance to ensure the functioning of the enlarged European Union.

Surely, no government wants to lose everything that has been agreed so far only because there is no agreement on the definition of qualified majority voting (QMV) in the Council of Ministers. Nevertheless, it is worth observing that few governments seemed really upset when, last December, the negotiations were cut short at the failed Brussels summit. The prevailing sentiment, rather, seemed to be one of relief.

This is because each member state has had to make certain painful concessions in the constitutional treaty. For different government leaders, the pain is in different places. For some integration goes too fast, for others too slow. Some have problems with the proposals on economic policy coordination and others with those on defence or criminal law cooperation. Even if, from an EU perspective, these seem to be acceptable compromises, they often remain hard to defend to national constituencies, especially for those governments who expect to have a referendum over the constitution.

But those pressing for a quick deal in the intergovernmental conference (IGC) are susceptible to two misconceptions. First, it is a mistake to think that the negotiations only hinge on finding a formula for the future definition of qualified majority voting in the Council. In fact, the argument over the definition of QMV is in many respects only a symptom concealing a much wider range of anxieties.

The second misconception is the belief that the present disagreements can be adequately addressed by coming up with compromises at the European level, whereas in fact the main problems with the constitution are domestic.

Member states can simply press ahead with talks and, sooner or later, with a sufficient dose of political manoeuvring and half-hearted compromises, all government leaders could be persuaded to sign up.

But then the latent differences are bound to recur with a vengeance in the ratification process. As it looks, the constitution will be subject to referenda in more than half of the 25 member states. It is quite likely that one or more of these would not deliver a positive vote right away. This would require the cajoling we already witnessed following the Danish rejection of the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the Irish "No" to the Treaty of Nice in 2001. Concessions would be made (preferably symbolic ones) and then, with a major public relations' effort, the citizens will be given a second chance to vote.

But all this is bound only to reinforce the downward trend of popular support for the EU, rather than marking the glorious reception of the European constitution and its high ambitions in terms of democracy, transparency and effectiveness.

However, the real problem is that - notwithstanding the sympathy around the European Convention - two years of constitutional debate in Brussels have failed to engage EU citizens so far. And by the time that they may get a say over the constitution, in the ratification procedure, people face the frustrating choice of "take it or be ready to stand accused by the whole EU".

Therefore, the present deadlock in the IGC should be taken as an opportunity to stand back a bit and to earnestly launch much-needed popular debates.

The forthcoming elections for the European Parliament in June provide for such an opportunity. Indeed, proceeding with negotiations while completely ignoring the European elections would only reinforce the polls' image of a charade.

The Irish EU presidency has made "communicating Europe" one of its central themes. If it wants to be true to this commitment, then it should propose the European Council in March to suspend the IGC, so as to allow for consultations with people in each member state.

To ensure that this pause would enable governments to return to the negotiation table in due course, two accompanying decisions must be taken.

First, the presidency needs to present a full consolidation of the agreements secured thus far by the IGC and clearly identify the issues still outstanding. Secondly, government leaders must sign up to a declaration in which they commit themselves to the adoption of the constitution and to a clear timetable to that effect. The IGC could then be resumed next autumn. On the basis of reports from national debates, which are expected to concentrate on the European elections, an inventory can be made of the issues still to be resolved in 2005.

This strategy is not without risk: as the suspension of the IGC will allow governments to unfreeze their positions, there is the danger that public debates would drive them even further apart instead of allowing them to reach agreement. There are no guarantees to prevent this from happening. However, the European Council declaration should commit government leaders to the clear need of adopting the constitution and of making concessions on all sides.

Surely, this is a risky road to take, open to abuse and relying very much on the good faith of the governments and the peoples. It does, however, face the present challenges head-on. The EU political elite will have to make an effort to realign itself with the citizens. In the long run, doggedly pressing ahead along the present course is bound to be a more risky and costly strategy.

Ben Crum is a Marie Curie Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) in Brussels.

Author suggests some much-needed popular debates take place on the draft European Constitution.