Convention must breathe life into EU’s democratic character

Date: 17/04/03

By Ben Crum

The Convention on the future of Europe is only paying lip-service to participatory democracy

IMPROVING the democratic character of the European Union was to be one of the main objectives of the Convention on the future of the EU.

The Laeken declaration of December 2001 that set out its mandate underlined the need to bring the European institutions closer to the citizens: "The Union needs to become more democratic, more transparent and more efficient".

On 4 April, the Convention's praesidium revealed the draft texts for the section in the constitutional treaty on "the democratic life of the Union". In the light of the urgency expressed in the Laeken declaration, these articles turn out to be rather disappointing.

The proposed section opens with two articles, proclaiming respectively the principle of democratic equality and of participatory democracy. Both of these principles seem based on lofty ideals (even though the latter one suddenly is remarkably concrete in singling out religious organisations as a major dialogue partner for the Union).

The one article in which the praesidium displays some substantive insight concerns the transparency of the Union's work. For the rest, the section includes an article on the election of the European Parliament that basically relies on last year's Council of Ministers' decision on the topic and an article on the voting rules in the Union's institutions that still needs to be filled in.

Thus, in marked contrast to most of the work of the Convention, the section on democracy appears to lack any structure. It is a mixed bag, bringing together some abstract principles and some specific provisions that might just as well be placed elsewhere in the treaty.

The lack of a democratic vision on the part of the Convention's praesidium can well be explained by the way it has structured the Convention's work. While the Convention has debated many issues extensively, in plenary and in specially designated working groups, the topic of European democracy has had no more than a cursory treatment.

Leading inevitably into the divisive issue of the Union's institutional structure, Convention chairman Valéry Giscard d'Estaing probably considered it wiser to keep the topic of democracy off the forum's agenda. Nevertheless, that very strategy has also precluded the possibility that elaboration of a common democratic vision might actually have provided some of the much-needed groundwork for a shared perspective on the Union's institutions. Instead, it is now up to the Convention plenary to come up with a systematic alternative to the praesidium's uninspiring proposals. Given the diversity of the 105-strong forum, the time constraints it is under and absence of any previous debate, this will not be easy.

Still, many of the Convention's earlier debates have already provided key elements to make it possible. If these elements are moved to the right place and their formulation is adequately revised, they can provide the proper basis for "the democratic life of the Union".

As a first step, inserting the principle of effective representation will serve to underline the importance of subjecting the legislative process to the control of representative institutions. Under this principle, the rule that no European legislation can be adopted without the express consent of the European Parliament - already endorsed by the Convention - can be reinstated. Complementary to that, the legislative activity of member state governments in the Council needs to be fully open to scrutiny by national parliaments.

A second, and probably more contestable step, would be to insert the principle of executive power's democratic accountability. The implementation of European measures often eludes the public eye. This is because most of it takes place in a decentralised fashion and also because executive power at the European level has often been insulated from political scrutiny.

There are good reasons for doing this. Yet, as found by the 1999 expert committee on mismanagement in the European Commission, wherever accountability mechanisms are lacking a culture of irregularities and irresponsibility may well develop. Besides the Commission, these concerns apply to other institutions that exercise power at the EU level, such as the European Central Bank and the roles of the high representative for foreign affairs, Europol and Eurojust. One only has to imagine the effects of one administrative blunder by any of the above to realise how little democratic legitimacy they can actually call upon.

While the principle of democratic accountability does not necessarily lead to putting these executive offices under direct Parliamentary control, it does point to a need to have the powers of these institutions properly ring-fenced by law. This would bind them to public disclosure of their activities and give the European Parliament the powers necessary to scrutinise them if it finds reason to do so. Principles of effective participation and accountability can provide the constitution's section on the democratic life of the Union with the vision and focus that it so far lacks.

Once substantially improved, this section should receive the place in the treaty that it deserves - in front of the provisions on the Union institutions. At the moment, it is a constitutional afterthought.

• Ben Crum is a Marie Curie Research Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels.

The author argues that the European Convention is failing to achieve one of its key objectives - improving the democratic character of the European Union.