Serious relationship must be next step for unlikely bedfellows

Date: 15/11/01

By Dick Leonard

Moscow finds itself in the spotlight with a fresh bid to be a cooperative international player. Dick Leonard argues that the EU should dare the Russian bear to live up to its promises: The European Union - and the European Commission in particular - has had an erratic record in choosing people for top diplomatic jobs. One of its more improbable appointments was its first ambassador to the Soviet Union, and subsequently Russia, in 1991.

Michael Emerson had no diplomatic experience or training, was not a Russian speaker and almost his entire career had been spent as an economist, working first for the OECD in Paris, and then in the economic and financial affairs division of the Commission.

Yet it turned out to be an inspired choice. Emerson took to the diplomatic life like a duck to water, established close relations with all the leading figures, particularly the reformist elements, around Boris Yeltsin, and his economic expertise came into its own in helping to assess the viability of projects bidding for funds under the EU's TACIS programme (Technical Assistance for the Commonwealth of Independent States). This became a key part of his work in Moscow.

It is arguable, however, that Emerson's contribution has been even greater since he left his post in 1996. First at the London School of Economics, and subsequently at the Brussels-based Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS), he has been working on the problems of what he calls 'the wider Europe'. In the process, he has produced a string of proposals which have proved fruitful for EU policy-makers.

His suggestion of a stability pact for south-east Europe was taken up with enthusiasm by the German presidency of the EU in 1999, and has since formed the basis of the EU's strategy in the Balkans. His subsequent proposal of a comparable pact for the Caucasus region - including scenarios for conflict resolution in Abkhazia, South Ossetia and Nagorno Karabakh - was welcomed by several governments in the region, and in unofficial quarters in Moscow.

It could, however, only be implemented with backing from President Putin, which has not (yet) been forthcoming, though with Putin's newly cooperative mood since 11 September this no longer seems so improbable. It would certainly represent the best hope open to him to achieve a settlement in Chechnya.

Emerson is now painting on an ever wider canvas. His new book, produced with three colleagues, The Elephant and the Bear (CEPS, 25 euro), discusses the future relationship between the EU and Russia, together with the 'near abroads' of both entities, comprising all the borderlands between them.

The image of Russia as a bear has a long provenance. Emerson explains his choice of an elephant to signify the EU, as follows: "It is even bigger than the bear, but is readily domesticated and has a placid character. It moves slowly but with great weight. It sometimes unintentionally tramples on smaller objects."

The biggest uncertainty on the European landscape at the beginning of the of the 21st century, he suggests, is "the cohabitation of the European elephant and the Russian bear".

In many ways, it is a mismatch, he argues. Apart from ideological differences, there are "huge structural asymmetries": the EU's population of 376 million dwarfs Russia's 145 million, while its economy is 20 times larger.

By contrast, Russia has ten times the nuclear arsenal of Britain and France combined, and is a huge energy exporter, while the EU is an importer, which Emerson notes "seems to be a stable equilibrium of mutual dependence".

What does the future hold? Will it be characterised by Gorbachev's concept of a Common European Home or will it be a Europe of two rival empires, even if the EU shows itself to be a reluctant one? The answer, in Emerson's view, may depend to a considerable extent on what happens to the borderlands between the two. He draws a sharp distinction between the 13 countries that are currently candidates for EU membership, and the others.

The former are all, in varying degrees, already well on the way to accepting western European norms and values. The prospect of EU membership within a finite period has, he believes, had an enormously beneficial effect.

Too many of the other states - which have not enjoyed this prospect - have fallen into the hands of ruling élites who have gone down "the dreadful double track of ethnic cleansing and misappropriation of state assets". At appalling cost, this process has been reversed in a number of states, including Croatia and Serbia, but there is no guarantee that the change will be permanent.

Yet it is not open to the EU to offer the prospect of early membership as an inducement to stay on the rails. It will be many years before any of these countries are in a position to meet the obligations.

The answer, Emerson tentatively suggests, may lie in "partial" membership, offering the precedent of the European Economic Area, which enables countries such as Norway, Iceland and Liechtenstein to share in a range of EU activities without signing up for the 'full Monty'.

Emerson's ideas were spelled out in more detail by his colleague Nicholas Whyte in a recent paper he delivered to a conference in Venice. Among EU actions which he suggests these countries might join are the single market, the EU monetary system (under which their currencies would be linked to the euro) and the customs union (which already includes Turkey).

At the same time they should be given economic and technical assistance on a similar basis to the candidate states. The more progress they made, the greater would be their rewards.

As for Russia, the EU should offer the prospect of a 'strategic partnership', which would include working together cooperatively to assist in the development of the borderlands and to help in Russia's own modernisation. A pipedream? Not if Putin's remarkable speech to the German Bundestag on 25 September and his summit with EU leaders on 3 October are anything to go by. The EU should take his declarations at face value and dare him to live up to them.

Major feature on EU-Russia relations.