Series Title | European Voice |
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Series Details | 06/03/97, Volume 3, Number 09 |
Publication Date | 06/03/1997 |
Content Type | News |
Date: 06/03/1997 NIGERIA's local government elections later this month should mark a significant step towards the county's return to democracy and the eventual resumption of EU development aid. But they will, in fact, be “a total farce”, according to Human Rights Watch, an organisation still pushing for democratic reform in the country long after the issue has faded from international media headlines. Despite a mountain of evidence that the elections - and the 'transition process' they purport to symbolise - are no more than skilful window-dressing, activists fear EU leaders will swallow General Sani Abacha's democratic posturing in a bid to increase their oil trade with the country. Eighteen months after the execution of Ogoni activist Ken Saro-Wiwa shot human rights abuses in Africa's most populous country to prominence, there is no indication that Abuja intends to mend its ways. Yet EU sanctions against the country remain weak and ultimately ineffective, say experts on the region. When a military tribunal sentenced General Abacha's best-known critic to death in November 1995, the global community exploded in outrage. The Union responded swiftly by cancelling development aid worth 200 million ecu, imposing an arms and sports embargo and denying visas to Nigeria's ruling junta. Yet, say officials, weapons stream into the country, members of the regime continue to shop in Harrods and the sports embargo has all but been forgotten by EU footballers. Furthermore, as EU prospectors scour Nigeria for lucrative supply contracts, the only sanction which would actually work - a ban on Nigerian oil exports to the Union - has been quietly elbowed off the negotiating table. Critics suggest that the EU's blind eye to Nigeria is one of the most blatant examples of its two-tiered approach to human rights. Where countries are poor and dependent on the Union, Europe is quite willing to use strong-arm tactics. The Commission has, for example, used “substantial influence” to push through reforms in neighbouring Niger, according to an official. It is no coincidence that Niger is largely dependent on EU aid, and has little to offer in return. But the lure of black gold has proved a highly distracting feature when politicians discuss whether to use similar tactics in Nigeria. Around 40&percent; of Nigerian oil exports go to the Union, whose trade with the country is worth around 3 billion ecu a year. Another 40&percent; goes to the US, providing a surprisingly convincing argument in Washington that relations with Abacha should be handled delicately. Tireless lobbying by European oil companies like Shell, Elf and Agip, backed up by American Mobil and Chevron, have fuelled the reluctance to impose tougher sanctions. Nigeria continues to benefit from its membership of the EU's Lomé Convention with the countries of Africa, the Caribbean and the Pacific (ACP), and is still cashing in on its valuable trade preferences. “The criteria by which the EU judges whether or not a process is democratic have become rather confused in Nigeria's case,” said one diplomat. “There is clearly a reluctance in the EU to make overtly critical comments about the regime.” Nevertheless, it will be difficult for Europe to remain silent over the coming weeks. This should, by all accounts, be the month when Nigeria finds its way back into the mainstream news. Aside from the elections, a hearing at the United Nations in Geneva, a joint EU-ACP parliamentary assembly in Brussels and a meeting of Union national experts will all serve to highlight the persistence of Abacha's hard-line regime. |
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Subject Categories | Politics and International Relations |
Countries / Regions | Africa |