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Abstract
International cooperation rests on state preferences with regard to the substantive scope, geographical range, and institutional depth of issue-specific devices to over-come collective action problems. Substantive broadening, geographical widening, and institutional deepening are the elixir of life of the European Union. As is familiar from international cooperation more in general, and not only from European integration, this rests upon a complex process of bargaining among states, each of which has its particular preferences. This paper explores two hypotheses about the relationship be-tween preferences on broadening, widening, and deepening. The first hypothesis as-sumes that the relationship is characterized by a virtuous cycle, while the second hy-pothesis assumes that there are tradeoffs rather than synergies. By looking at a sample of 24 distinct case studies from a specific policy field, namely international coopera-tion against drugs, the paper shows that, at least in this particular policy field, state preferences follow a synergetic pattern of broadening, widening, and deepening.
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