Series Title | The Economist |
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Series Details | No.8423, 23.4.05 |
Publication Date | 23/04/2005 |
ISSN | 0013-0613 |
Content Type | Journal | Series | Blog, News |
How to respond to perennial demands from separatists in Spain IT IS the problem that won't go away. Ever since Spain adopted its present constitution in 1978, its restive regions, especially the Basque country and Catalonia, have agitated for more autonomy from Madrid. As it happens, voters in last weekend's Basque elections gave a rebuff to their nationalist premier, Juan José Ibarretxe, who had hoped for stronger support so that he could hold a referendum on the right to form a “free state associated with Spain”. But even if the Ibarretxe plan is dead in its present form, demands for more autonomy and even, one day, for independence seem sure to persist. It thus behoves the government in Madrid to work out carefully how to respond. Successive Spanish governments have been willing to concede plenty of autonomy. But they have rigidly refused to contemplate any possibility of secession. The tone was set by the previous People's Party government under José Maria Aznar, who refused even to meet Mr Ibarretxe, arguing that any negotiation, even with moderate Basque nationalists, would not only threaten the territorial integrity of Spain but also represent a concession to the Basque terrorists, ETA, whose political wing was banned. Mr Aznar's Socialist successor, José Luis Rodriguez Zapatero, has been more flexible. There are encouraging hints, after the Basque election, that he may now negotiate a deal with Mr Ibarretxe that could lead to a revised plan, including extra autonomy but stopping short of full independence, being put to the vote. A ceasefire by ETA, now bizarrely represented in the Basque parliament by the local Communists, would have to be part of the deal. Yet the formal position in Madrid remains that any vote on independence, by any region, is unconstitutional and cannot be allowed. Nobody should advocate concessions to men of violence. Yet a refusal to listen to peaceful demands for independence is short-sighted. Worse, it is likely to be counter-productive. Mr Aznar's intransigence seems to have served largely to bolster the nationalist vote in the Basque country. The latest election suggests that Mr Zapatero's flexibility may instead be weakening it. The best policy now would be for Mr Zapatero to go a stage further, by accepting that, if a majority of any region's people ever peacefully decides that they want independence, the government in Madrid should be ready to negotiate. Such a course has been followed successfully in Canada over Quebec. Rather than asserting that any demand for independence by Quebec was illegal, the federal government decided, following a Supreme Court ruling, to pass the so-called Clarity Act in 2000. This act sets out the conditions which Quebec (or any other province) would have to fulfil if it wished to secede: it would have to hold a referendum on a simple and clear question; it would have to secure a clear majority in favour; and it would then have to negotiate the terms of its departure with the government in Ottawa. The benefit of the Clarity Act is not just that it sets out a procedure for peaceful secession, if a majority of a region wants it. It is that it seems, at least for now, to have defused the demand for secession itself. Countries will not always hold together, especially when there have been wars: in the next few years both Kosovo and Montenegro are likely to break free of Serbia, for example. But experience has often shown that, when the notion of secession is stamped on, pressure for it only rises - whereas, if secession is clearly permitted, many would-be secessionists cease to press so hard for it. Editorial on how to respond to perennial demands from separatists in Spain. |
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Source Link | Link to Main Source http://www.economist.com |
Countries / Regions | Spain |