Iran. Decision time approaches

The hard diplomatic task of denuclearising Iran

IS IRAN'S theocratic regime much of a threat to anyone other than its own mightily put-upon people? And even if it is, what can the outside world do about it? Twenty-five years after the revolution that brought the ayatollahs to power, their grip is again crushing the breath out of would-be reformers. Critics in the press are locked up. Human rights are trampled. A new conservative-dominated parliament has squelched plans for much-needed economic reforms. With hardliners in the ascendant, hope of turning aside Iran's troubling nuclear ambitions is fading too. Yet a nuclear-armed Iran is a danger worth averting.

Over the past 18 months Iran has reluctantly confessed to breaking every rule in the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) rule-book. That is, bar one: it still denies trying to build a bomb. Few believe that. If all it wanted, as it claims, was to use nuclear power to keep the lights on, why lie for 18 years to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the UN body that checks that nuclear materials are not diverted for military purposes? Why secretly experiment with plutonium and uranium (both possible bomb ingredients)? Why buy machinery from blackmarket middlemen - the same ones who supplied Libya with a weapon design as part of its uranium-enrichment starter kit? The IAEA's latest report on Iran this week adds no new charges. Yet the rule-breaking record stands.

Would it matter if Iran did get the bomb? It no longer attempts to export revolution, and it lives in a dangerous neighbourhood, now with American troops also nearby. Although it contributes to those dangers, by refusing to recognise Israel's right even to exist, and by arming groups that reject peace with it, Iran fires off rhetorical salvoes, not missiles. Wouldn't a nuclear-armed Iran be similarly deterred, since any attempt to use its weapons would invite a devastating response?

Bear in mind that cold-war deterrence between America and the Soviet Union barely survived numerous crises and miscalculations. A fissile region that has lived uneasily with Israel's bombs would be unlikely to accept a nuclear-armed Iran with equanimity. Whatever Iran's motives - regional primacy or mere technological one-upmanship - the nuclear chain reaction could quickly see Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Syria and even Turkey follow suit. Unlike India, Pakistan and Israel, which never signed the NPT, Iran's violations would also fatally undermine a treaty that has so far kept regional rivalries below the nuclear threshold in many dangerous places.

It was in hopes of averting all this that last October Britain, France and Germany offered Iran a face-saver: a delay in reporting its nuclear transgressions to the UN Security Council if Iran suspended all uranium-enrichment-related activity and told all to the IAEA's inspectors. If suspension turned permanent, more trade and technology would flow. But Iran's nuclear story was full of holes. Enrichment-related work never quite ceased, and more is under way again. Yet Iran wants the IAEA off its case.

Beyond shoulder-shrugging, outsiders now have two options: more diplomacy, or force. There are no very good military options - Iran's nuclear installations are scattered, and some may be hidden - but there are some. As Israel likes to point out, its attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981 put back Saddam Hussein's bomb-building ambitions. It is also worth noting, however, that it did not end them. Yet for diplomacy to nudge Iran on to a safer course, it will need to be a lot more muscular, and better co-ordinated, than hitherto.

Add to the costs, expand the benefits

The Europeans' October gambit has failed. When the IAEA's board meets later this month there is no longer any excuse to delay reporting Iran's rule-breaking to the Security Council. But then what? When North Korea was similarly reported, for breaking the NPT and then flouncing out, Russia and China blocked further action. Russia claims to oppose both treaty-breaking and force; in that case, it needs to lean on Iran a lot harder. America argues, rightly, that without the credible threat of international sanctions (not just its own), hitting trade and investment in oil and gas, the clerics won't budge. Yet if they are to weigh differently the costs of their nuclear option, they also need to know what alternative future to expect.

Iran can still enjoy the benefits of civilian nuclear power, even after giving up its dangerous fuel technologies. Talks on that need to lead on to a wider dialogue - including with reluctant America. Meanwhile an Iran that lives up to its anti-nuclear promises would be a likelier candidate for WTO membership. And as a first step towards a more secure Middle East, free of all weapons of mass destruction, there needs to be serious discussion of regional confidence-building measures. Will Israel-hating Iran buy any of that? Backed by the threat of real sanctions, it is worth a try. If diplomacy is ever to denuclearise Iran, the time to try harder is now.

Editorial feature discusses the efforts by the EU and the international community to denuclearise Iran.

International Atomic Energy Agency: News Centre: In Focus: IAEA and Iran http://www.iaea.or.at/NewsCenter/Focus/IaeaIran/index.shtml

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