Author (Person) | Bower, Helen | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Publisher | ProQuest Information and Learning | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Series Title | In Focus | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Series Details | 24.6.03 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Publication Date | 24/06/2003 | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Content Type | News, Overview, Topic Guide | In Focus | ||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
A proposal for a future EU security strategy was presented by Javier Solana, the EU's High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy, to EU leaders at the European Council in Thessaloniki on 20 June 2003, with the emphasis on the EU assuming its role as 'a global actor' in international relations. Entitled 'A Secure Europe for a Better World', the 16 page document seeks to strengthen the EU's foreign policy following the disputes between Member States over the Iraq crisis and ahead of the EU's enlargement to 25 countries in 2004. The paper follows a call from EU foreign ministers at the Informal External relations Council meeting (Gymnich) in Rhodes on 2-3 May 2003 to examine ways to take the EU's foreign and security policy forward with the aims of strengthening the common voice of the EU on foreign policy issues and making EU intervention in international affairs more effective. Although intended for an in-depth discussion at the EU-US Summit to be held in Washington on 25 June 2003, the summit in Thessaloniki provided EU leaders with the opportunity to discuss the ideas first. The document identifies the three main threats to European security as:
In order to respond to these threats, the doctrine suggests that the EU must exert its influence to prevent conflict or take 'pre-emptive engagement' through 'effective multilateral institutions'. The strategy also calls for greater co-operation between Member States both in diplomatic and defence terms. The paper cites that the Member States have a total of more than 45,000 diplomats spread across the world, suggesting that a pooling of these resources would significantly strengthen the EU's diplomatic capability. On the defence front, the strategy once again urges Member States to pool their defence resources in order to boost their military operations, claiming that with more than €160 billion spent on defence in an EU of 25, the Union 'should if required, be able to sustain several operations simultaneously'. The strategy also refers to global problems such as poverty, bad governance, the abuse of power and corruption and suggests broadening the St. Petersberg tasks to include joint disarmament operations, support for third countries in combating terrorism and security sector reform. In essence, the doctrine proposes three strategic objectives:
All this, Solana suggests, can only be achieved through multilateral cooperation in international organisations and through partnerships with other key actors or regions. The importance of the Transatlantic relationship, severely bruised by the Iraq crisis, is recognised with the suggestion that by 'acting together, the European Union and the United States can be a formidable force for good in the world' but strengthening relationships with Russia, Canada, India, Japan and China should also be a priority in the coming years. In principle, EU leaders welcomed the strategy at the Thessaloniki Summit, evidence that the divides caused by the Iraq crisis may be bridged. The three big EU military powers - France, Germany and the UK - all praised the strategy: the UK government welcomed the emphasis on proactive efforts to respond to the threats of terrorism and weapons of mass destruction; Gerhard Schröder, the German chancellor, embraced the focus on multilateral institutions; and President Jacques Chirac of France welcomed the doctrine because it made clear that countries, including the US, could not act alone and expect to be effective. The ten future EU Member States also openly welcomed the doctrine because of the explicit support for the US and NATO. However, the real differences of opinion on the EU's future security strategy are likely to show themselves in the coming months as the details of the doctrine are thrashed out. Following discussions at the EU-US Summit, the practical aspects of implementation will be worked out with the aim of presenting a more complete EU security strategy at the European Council in Rome in December 2003, under the leadership of the Italian Presidency.
Helen Bower Compiled: Tuesday, 24 June 2003 Keywords: European Security Doctrine; A Secure Europe for a Better World |
|||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||||
Subject Categories | Politics and International Relations, Security and Defence |