Russia’s presidential election: Putin redux

Date: 20/03/04

Seeking clues on the second Putin term

WHEN the blazing roof of the Manezh exhibition hall collapsed on March 14th, the watching crowd burst into applause. Russians love a tragedy as much as a conspiracy, and the fire at the old riding-school near the Kremlin, just after voting closed in Russia's presidential election, was both. By comparison, Vladimir Putin's re-election, with 71% of the vote, was boringly predictable.

Yet the election did spring one surprise. Nikolai Kharitonov, who stood for the Communist Party instead of its leader, Gennady Zyuganov, won nearly 14%. That is roughly what the party scored in December's parliamentary election, but three times as much as the opinion polls had predicted. Core Communist supporters, mainly older and provincial voters whose lives have improved little in four years of Mr Putin's rule, still appear loyal to the party.

Mr Putin seemed to get the message: the vote for his opponents was, he said, “essential information for the current authorities, including myself, so that we can all take account of the opinions and views of those politicians.” He spoke at length about the need for democracy, a strong civil society and press freedom, but as a sop to critics of the media bias and other tricks of his campaign. Mr Putin's democratic instincts are not well-honed: he, alone of the candidates, refused to take part in televised debates, saying “I know my opponents' every word down to the last detail.”

The next few months may offer a clearer idea about what the enigmatic Mr Putin really wants - and can deliver. Theoretically, he has more power than ever, with full control of parliament and a new government, appointed before the election, that has purged all remaining allies of the powerful “oligarchs”. Theoretically, he can steam ahead with reforms to improve the business climate, tackle corruption, slim the bureaucracy and invest in social infrastructure. When over 50 people died in Arkhangelsk this week after a horrific gas explosion, it merely confirmed that underinvestment is killing more Russians than terrorism.

Yet Kremlin-watchers debate if Mr Putin is as strong as he seems, or if he is beholden to interest groups, such as state-owned energy companies. The new government looks shaken up, with 17 ministries instead of 30, but most ministers have kept their jobs or been reshuffled; the new structure creates more agencies than it abolishes. It remains to be seen how aggressively, and how fast, the government tackles reforms.

So far the signs are of caution. This week Mr Putin broke his silence on the restructuring of the state gas monopoly, Gazprom, proposing to scrap the “ringfence” (a ban on foreigners owning domestically traded shares), create an internal gas market, and give other Russian producers access to Gazprom's pipelines. But he did not mention more radical steps, such as breaking the company into separate production and distribution parts, or scrapping the two-tier system of domestic and export gas prices that is one of the European Union's main demands before Russia can join the World Trade Organisation.

In short, Mr Putin is, for now, sticking to what he does best: balancing between the extremes. But moderation may not be enough if he is to have a real chance of transforming the economy - and the country - over the next four years.