Policy Brief: The Political Economy of Environmentally Related Taxes

Preserving the environment is high on the agenda for both governments and society. Governments in OECD countries are using a variety of instruments to change environmentally harmful behaviour, and taxes have proved a useful string to their bow. Using taxes to achieve an environmental objective, such as reducing emissions of a particular pollutant, is efficient from an economic point of view and offers flexibility to adapt for those affected. Direct regulation of polluting activities, for example by setting legal limits on the emission level of certain pollutants, forces immediate compliance regardless of the comparative cost for different businesses and individuals, and can be more difficult and costly for some than for others. Environmental taxes leave more flexibility for those affected, because they can essentially “buy time” to make changes which will mean they do not have to pay the tax in the future. Thus, a tax on polluting activities or products allows those who can cut emissions cheaply to do so first, while allowing those with higher pollution control costs to pay the tax while taking time to make technological adjustments. This means that the economy as a whole will meet the same environmental objective more cheaply than by using direct regulation. While using taxes to achieve environmental objectives is clearly efficient for the economy as a whole, however, in practice individual businesses or sectors may resist because they will be “losers” in the equation. Governments need to address such concerns about the negative impacts of environmental taxes on sectoral competitiveness and on income distribution if environmentally related taxes are to be a useful tool. This Policy Brief looks at the political economy of environmental taxes and how governments can use them in conjunction with other policy instruments to achieve their environmental objectives.

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