Guarding the guards. The European Convention and the communitization of police co-operation

Abstract:

One of the core principles of the liberal constitutional state, namely that the police must be subject to efficient parliamentary and judicial control, has been challenged by the establishment of a European Police Office (Europol). As with justice and home affairs co-operation more generally, Europol has deliberately been kept at arm's length from any supranational control by the European Parliament and the European Court of Justice. Critics were particularly concerned about the envisioned assignment of operational powers to Europol which aggravate the gap between policing powers and the ineffectiveness of their control. After two intergovernmental conferences had failed to establish effective parliamentary and judicial control over Europol, the Constitutional Convention agreed to abolish the pillar structure and, as a consequence, subject Europol to supranational control. This paper analyses the arguments put forward in favour of constitutionalization and the conditions that contributed to successful constitutionalization in the convention.