Why the European Union gave Turkey the green light

Abstract:

This article analyses the compromise reached by the European Union (EU) in December 2004 regarding the starting of accession negotiations with Turkey. More specifically, it argues that the EU decision on Turkey cannot be accounted for exclusively in terms of interest-based calculations but must be looked at in the light of polity norms and institutional arrangements. The main reason is that the EU resolved to open the door to Turkey becoming a member state despite it being generally recognized that the costs of accession would be certain, high and immediate in relation to uncertainty over the benefits. Along the path leading to the 2004 outcome, strategic calculations made by member states were locked into treaty-based norms and the institutional arrangements following the EU decision in 1999 to grant Turkey the status of candidate. While accepting that instrumental dynamics and structural factors coexist, this article explores the way in which polity norms and institutional arrangements had constraining effects on interest-based attempts to delay and even undermine the candidate's accession prospects.