EU calls Iran’s nuclear bluff

Date: 01/06/06

Kumho, 240 kilometres north east of the North Korean capital Pyongyang is a monument to failed diplomacy. In 1994 the US-led KEDO international consortium agreed to provide North Korea with 'proliferation-proof' nuclear facilities, including a light-water reactor located at Kumho.

The offer was designed to stem Pyongyang's desire to develop alternative nuclear facilities that could be used to produce an atomic bomb.

A decade later the Kumho site is unfinished. The light-water reactor has not been delivered. Pyongyang is currently thought to have in its possession one, possibly two, atomic bombs.

Now, the international community, led by the EU, is once again trying to stem a country's nuclear ambitions by providing proliferation-proof nuclear facilities. The target today is Iran.

The logic of the EU and US offers was simple. Light- water reactors do not produce weapons-grade plutonium, unlike their heavy-water equivalents. The enriched uranium which light-water reactors need to run would be supplied by an international consortium. This would eliminate the need for North Korea or Iran to create its own uranium enrichment facilities, which could also be used to create weapons-grade material.

As an extra sweetener, the US offered 500,000 tonnes of heavy fuel oil each year for heating. The EU is currently garnering international support for its proposal to furnish Iran with the reactor and other economic sweeteners.

In return, Iran would be required to close the Natanz uranium enrichment facility and halt construction of the Araq heavy-water reactor.

EU diplomats say they are offering Iran what it says it wants - civilian nuclear power.

"If Iran rejects it, it will be clear that it does not want to co-operate," Javier Solana, the EU's foreign policy chief, remarked recently.

Still, the offer was described by Iran's president before it was even submitted as "exchanging chocolates for gold". The US administration, too, is sceptical, fearing the offer does little to slow Iran's nuclear programme.

Other critics warn that insisting on zero domestic enrichment would force Iran to develop clandestine projects.

US concerns may be well founded given Iran's apparent rush to create all the elements of a nuclear warhead, from highly enriched fissile material to the ballistic missiles that could deliver it.

Washington is also concerned about the reliability of western intelligence.

If Iran takes up the EU's offer and is found to be producing or seeking enriched uranium or weapons-grade plutonium it would be a clear 'smoking gun'.

In North Korea, because of poor intelligence, the smoking gun was discovered too late.

Iran may be a more open society than North Korea and has been subject to more intrusive international inspections, but there are few other reasons to believe that intelligence would be any more accurate in detecting clandestine activities. Intelligence-gathering is complicated by the EU and US' lack of insight into the workings of the regime. One US official recently said of decision-making inside the Iranian regime: "We know that there are differences of opinion in as much as they are individuals."

The failure of KEDO also shows the need for good planning, according to Adam Ward of the International Institute for Strategic Studies.

Ward describes the KEDO project as being plagued by finger-pointing. North Korea demanding the transfer of technology and the US and other partners the transfer of information.

According to Ward the ideal scenario would be for Iran fully to disclose its previous nuclear activities before a brick is laid. This would significantly help intelligence assessments.

But Tehran is highly unlikely to do so, although the EU's offer may at least force Iran to reveal its intentions.

If the EU's offer does not limit Iran to a civilian nuclear programme it could still be useful. The tactical use of concessions could create the conditions for the regime to reassess its choice over time.

If Iran responds negatively to the EU's offer it will be more difficult to convince the international community, including Russia and China, that its intentions are good.

For the EU it could also provide good political cover for putting further pressure on Iran, perhaps including sanctions.

Whatever its choice, Iran will have to answer the question implicit in the EU's offer: would you rather have nuclear capabilities or healthy relations with the rest of the world? This question could lead to another monument to failed diplomacy.

Iran - what comes next

The EU track: The EU is busy trying to win backing from the non-EU members of the United Nations Security Council - the US, Russia and China - for its proposals to provide Iran with limited civilian nuclear capabilities. Following six hours of "positive" talks in London last Wednesday (24 May) the EU hopes backing could come at a ministerial meeting later this week. Iran has already rejected the offer.

The UN track: If the permanent five members of the Security Council accept the EU's proposal it is likely to be adopted in parallel with a UN Security Council resolution which is currently being drawn up. The major debate on the resolution is whether it invokes mandatory compliance under Chapter 7 of the UN Charter. Depending on the type of Chapter 7 measures referred to, the resolution could trigger sanctions or the eventual use of force if Iran does not fulfil its obligations.

Although details are unclear, both the EU proposal and the Security Council resolution will call on Iran to suspend uranium enrichment and halt other nuclear activities (except perhaps at the Russia-built light water reactor at Bushehr). If Iran rejects the EU offer and so at the same time is found in non-compliance with the Security Council resolution, sanctions are almost certain to follow. If negotiations on the resolution are not successful, Washington has said it would pursue sanctions outside the UN. Getting the EU on board is seen as a prerequisite for any sanctions to have an impact.

Article takes a look at plans by the EU and the US to offer Iran alternative nuclear facilities in exchange for giving up its uranium enrichment activities which could also be used to produce an atomic bomb. Similar attempts to deal with North Korea's nuclear plans in the 1990s are considered a failure.

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