Charlemagne. Playing soft or hard cop

Iran provides a test of both Europe's "soft power" and its relationship with hard power

NOT since Athens and Persia went to war in the 5th century BC has Iran mattered so much to Europe. For the past few years, it has been the biggest test of the European Union's ability to affect such global issues as nuclear proliferation and energy security. It is also testing whether that most characteristic EU foreign-policy instrument, soft power, can work beyond the immediate neighbourhood. To its supporters, soft power is a slower, surer, more civilised way of exercising influence than crude force. Does the evidence from Iran bear this out?

It should be conceded right away that Iran has given soft power a reasonably fair hearing. Although some Europeans complain almost routinely that American indifference has sabotaged their efforts, for most of the past year George Bush's administration has put its weight behind the British, French and Germans (the so-called European three) on Iran. Moreover, Iran itself signed up to the process, at least at the start.

Soft power has also had some successes. It may have slowed Iran's plans by a couple of years, delaying the confrontation over Iran's nuclear programme to 2006 rather than 2003, a time when many European countries were locking horns with America over the invasion of Iraq. Europe's attempts to help on Iran have soothed some of the transatlantic wounds left by Iraq, which in its turn helped to rally the Americans behind the European three. That could not have been predicted in 2003, when some members of the Bush administration were wondering whether Tehran should be the next stop after Baghdad.

Because the European three also spoke, in broad terms, for the union as a whole, they probably brought something to the talks that America could not have done on its own. Iran can hardly claim to be the victim of some American hegemonic plot, still less of Washington's fabled Jewish lobby, for instance. And the Europeans do seem to have been negotiating in good faith. This has made it sound more convincing to the rest of the world when they back the International Atomic Energy Agency's conclusion that Iran has been hiding parts of its nuclear programme and most governments' suspicions that Iran has been lying about its intentions.

As a result, it may be easier to isolate Iran than it would have been had no talks been held. And it has slightly increased the chance that Russia and China will be ready to back some sort of coercive action by the United Nations Security Council. Even if European diplomacy has now ended, it has put international institutions--the IAEA, the UN--at centre stage for the next phase (see page 53). To Europeans, this is a good thing in itself.

What all this adds up to, however, is the conclusion that soft power may have been effective at changing the behaviour of America, and possibly Russia and China. That is, it sustained itself as a policy and was not undermined by western squabbles. Yet the original purpose was, presumably, to change the behaviour of Iran, by drawing it into a gentle web of mutual rights and obligations. Is Iran changing? Nobody outside Iran knows. Diplomatic efforts are continuing. But the signs do not exactly look promising. "Thank God, our enemies are idiots," said one prominent Iranian cleric recently. Instead of thinking about a web of obligations, the Iranians are talking solely about their rights to have whatever nuclear technology they choose.

For soft power to succeed, both sides must want something from the other, and must be reasonably honest about it. Yet between 2003 and 2005--that is, even before the election of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad--Iran was negotiating in bad faith. During this period, European officials believe, it continued to work in secret on nuclear research, having promised to suspend uranium enrichment.

Moreover, there is one issue on which soft power has nothing to offer. If Iran wanted a security guarantee (as some have suggested), then Europe, which has no significant military forces in the region and no power to affect regional stability, was in no position to provide one. Only America could do that. This does not mean the attempt to use soft power was a waste of time. But it suggests that European efforts would never have worked on their own. There always had to be a hard-power component, perhaps an Iran-America deal on security to match an Iran-Europe one on trade and proliferation.

Mars and Venus

For Europeans, that raises the toughest question of all. Does soft power support or supplant hard power? America backed the Europeans not just because it had no better idea what to do but because it thought European diplomacy might reinforce American bellicosity (and vice versa). To the Americans, there is merit in a good cop/bad cop approach to policing the world. Now that the good cop has suffered a setback, people are weighing their truncheons. John McCain, a Republican senator, has said that, bad as war would be, a nuclear-armed Iran would be worse.

But for true believers in soft power, the point is not to support but to supplant brute force. It is a better way of managing global tensions: a rival star, not a best supporting actor. To those who think like this, the talking can never stop. Some Europeans still say that military action is inconceivable and threats of sanctions are unhelpful. This seems a characteristic European cast of mind. Nothing is ever decided. The European project is never finished. And even if something seems to have been tried and failed, there is always a chance to try--and fail?--again.

The crisis with Iran has exposed rather than reconciled these transatlantic differences. They are likely to get sharper over the next few months. As Robert Kagan of the Carnegie Endowment argues, both hard and soft power have their characteristic flaws. Hard-power advocates can be too quick to pull the trigger--as, arguably, in Iraq. But for soft-power believers, there is never a trigger to pull--as, possibly, in Iran.

Commentary feature. Iran provides a test of both Europe's 'soft power' and its relationship with hard power: the United States.

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