Searching for a common vision of the EU’s future

Date: 06/07/2000

The re-emergence of the Franco-German alliance has ruffled feathers in national capitals across Europe. But their chances of turning their vision of a new era of integration into a reality depends on whether they can resolve their differences over what the new Europe should look like. Simon Taylor reports

IN PARIS, the elegantly clad French political elite at the Quai d"Orsay were rolling up their sleeves for a bruising set of negotiations in order to deliver a new Treaty of Nice in December. Meanwhile, from Berlin, President Jacques Chirac's speech on the future of the European Union threatened to blow the entire timetable off schedule.

Chirac's call for a "pioneer group" of countries to push ahead with European integration and a constitution to underpin the enterprise was met with clenched teeth by the members of the Socialist government, who want a successful and productive French presidency.

French Foreign Minister Hubert Vedrine outlined the risks of launching a debate about the far-away destiny of Europe while the short-term challenges of the new treaty still had to be settled. "If we don"t make a success of Nice, all our debate will be for nothing," he warned.

Pierre Moscovici, the minister for European affairs who faces the prospect of many long nights as he strives to stitch the new treaty together, also distanced his government from Chirac's vision, saying: "It is clear that it is not the speech of the French authorities."

The most obvious explanation for Chirac's willingness to muddy the waters on institutional reform for the French presidency is to be found in domestic politics. In May 2002, Chirac will have to defend his tenure of the sumptuous presidential Elysee Palace against a bid from Prime Minister Lionel Jospin. Chirac's Berlin speech was clearly the first shot in a battle with Jospin to use the French presidency to stake a claim on the country's top job.

The Gaullist was also exploiting the government's limited room to manoeuvre on European affairs, knowing that Jospin has to face the left-wing Eurosceptics in his ruling coalition. Not only are the Communists wary of any further shift in power to Brussels, but Jospin also has to deal with the Mouvement des Citoyens (MDC) party, which Home Affairs Minister Jean-Pierre Chevenement founded to oppose the Maastricht Treaty.

Some success of the international front would help Jospin, who has struggling with a difficult package of tax reforms and has locked horns with public sector workers - one of the Socialists" natural constituencies.

Both Chirac and Jospin are aware that, in France at least, there is a substantial appetite among the electorate for a European Union which is seen to be acting directly in the interests of citizens. Recent opinion polls showed a desire for the Union to go further in defending consumer health, protecting the environment, and improving citizens" civil and legal rights. The French public is also eager to see moves to strengthen the EU's military capability so that future crises such as Bosnia or Kosovo can be tackled quickly and effectively.

This is the source of the Euro-populism of the French presidency's priorities, illustrated by subjects like maritime safety in the wake of the Erika tanker disaster earlier this year which devastated large parts of the Brittany coast.

Despite the political gains to be made by exploiting the presidency, Jospin is also nervous about venturing into the foreign policy terrain, which is normally the traditional preserve of the president, because of his disastrous attempt to raise his profile in the Middle East. During a visit to the refugee camps in the Lebanon, Jospin needed the muscle of the French security service to protect him against the wrath of a crowd enraged by his reference to Hizbollah fighters as terrorists.

But it would be wrong to mistake the French government's reluctance to support Chirac's vision for the future of Europe for outright opposition to the outlines of his Berlin speech.

When Germany's Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer called for a European federation, complete with a government and a parliament, Vedrine initially distanced himself from the idea, warning that it could jeopardise efforts to reach a deal on EU treaty reform at the Nice summit.

In fact, Vedrine and Fischer's officials in their respective foreign ministries cooperated closely in the run-up to the speech. The common ground between Fischer's vision of a "centre of gravity" and Chirac's call last week for a "pioneer group" of member states was an attempt to address fears that the next wave of enlargement would set the EU's current institutional arrangements in stone.

As Chirac said at last month's Feira summit: "We need an open number of countries to be able to show the way forward if we do not want Europe to break down." His initiative also reflected French awareness of German Chancellor Gerhard Schroder's problems with the federal states, with calls for the debate about the future of Europe to include "clearly defining the division of competences between the different levels of Europe".

The two-pronged attempt to relaunch the Franco-German alliance as the motor for European integration sent shockwaves through the less Euro-enthusiast countries of the EU.

Ironically, Chirac's speech came just the Union was drawing up a strategy to end the sanctions policy against the Austrian government because of fears that continuing Vienna's diplomatic isolation could have a negative impact on this September's Danish referendum on joining the euro.

His words were seized on by critics as proof that the French and Germans were prepared to ride roughshod over other member states" wishes in the drive for closer integration.

But while it is possible to argue, as Vedrine has done, that the "collective brain-storming" which resulted in the Fischer and Chirac speeches is premature, the chances of creating a two-speed Union through "enhanced cooperation" does appear to have become much more likely.

Although the UK and Spain have indicated that they would block any attempt to make it easier to use the mechanism in the Nice Treaty, the French have made it clear that some countries will go ahead with new forms of cooperation come what may. "You cannot oppose the inevitable," said one senior French official.

Yet it remains difficult to see where there is a real appetite for using the option. Chirac has cited economic and financial policy, defence and justice and home affairs as areas where some countries could push ahead without being held back by the more cautious states. In practice, this seems unlikely. Binding agreements in the economic field would be ruled out by the risk of distorting the internal market, while France's defence and justice ministers have all stated that they are happy to continue to working on a government-to-government basis.

The limited scope for using enhanced cooperation suggests that the prospect of some countries pushing further ahead is being used as a sword of Damocles to try to ensure that EU countries agree to sufficiently far-reaching treaty changes in Nice. Otherwise, the Union will not be able to function properly once the first wave of enlargement has taken place.

The fact that Paris and Berlin clearly see eye-to-eye on this point is no great surprise. What is more interesting, however, are the emerging differences between their visions for the EU's future.

While Fischer's speech proposed a reworking of the classical European federation with a government at Union level and a parliament with full legislative rights, Chirac sketched out an Union which would work on an inter-governmental rather than Community basis.

The French president even proposed the biggest threat to the European Commission's power to date by calling for a new secretariat to be set up to assess whether new forms of cooperation would clash with existing treaty rules. The European Parliament would also be increasingly sidelined, with national assemblies given a stronger role in overseeing new legislation agreed at European level, as already happens in France.

The re-emergence of the Franco-German alliance may have ruffled feathers in national capitals across Europe. But the key factor which will determine whether the Fischer-Chirac vision of a new era of integration becomes a reality is whether Paris and Berlin can resolve their differences about what the new Europe should look like.

Major feature. The re-emergence of the Franco-German alliance has ruffled feathers in national capitals across Europe. But their chances of turning their vision of a new era of integration into a reality depends on whether they can resolve their differences over what the new Europe should look like.