Russia’s ‘market’ economy: a bad case of predatory capitalism

Book abstract:

This is an account of Russia's transition to the market, tracing its tortuous development as a fledgling market economy during the 1990's through to its spectacular collapse in August 1998. The book follows the historical mismanagement of Russian wealth through to the Soviet command economy, and on to Gorbachev and aims to explain why Boris Yeltsin's economic reforms ended in such dismal failure. It reveals how and why cultural specificity and history has created such formidable obstacles in the way of Western style reforms and how these differences affect current decision-making. The author concludes by discussing what lessons should be learned from the damage inflicted on the Russian economy, as well as its social, legal and political infrastructure, by the race for reform.
The book is structured into four sections. The first is mainly introductory. Section two presents a framework for the subsequent analysis, charting the legislature, the judiciary, the financial markets and the entrepreneurial sector and looks at the prelude to events taking place under Gorbachev. Section three presents the economic reform programme, looking at the first years of high inflation, leading to a great redistribution of wealth and incomes, the subsequent period of low inflation, when the government resorted to massive borrowing, and examines the political scandals surrounding privatization deals and the political leadership style of Boris Yeltsin. Section four contains the theoretical analysis.

The author, Stefan Hedlund is Professor of East European Studies at Uppsala University, Sweden. He is the author of a number of books on Soviet and post-Soviet affairs. The book is intended for those studying politics, economics, East European Studies, as well as for general courses on Russia's post-Soviet development.