Bosnia weathers the Kosovan storm

Date: 13/05/1999

As Milosevic clings on to power in Belgrade despite the NATO airstrikes, Carlos Westendorp, the west's top diplomat in Bosnia-Herzegovina, tells Simon Taylor why he is confident that moderate forces will prevail in Serbia

While the eyes of the world are focused on the conflict in Kosovo, the High Representative to Bosnia-Herzegovina Carlos Westendorp has launched a plea for people not to forget the multi-ethnic state.

For Westendorp, there can only be one solution to the crisis in Kosovo: getting rid of President Slobodan Milosevic and restoring democracy in Yugoslavia.

" The only exit strategy is victory over Milosevic," argues the dapper Spanish diplomat, who may hang up his High Representative's hat in June if he wins a seat in the European Parliament.

Despite the difficulties that the conflict in Kosovo has caused for the fragile shoots of democracy and stability in Bosnia, Westendorp is adamant it is a price worth paying to bring about a change of power in Belgrade and usher in an era of stability in former Yugoslavia.

" There can be no solution for one country without a general solution for the region," he insists. "It is an illusion to think there is a possible solution with Milosevic."

"I knew that open conflict in Kosovo would have serious consequences in Bosnia-Herzegovina, but I do not think we could have done otherwise because of Milosevic's preparations", he adds, insisting it was a "clear fact" that he was planning a "spring season" of ethnic cleansing attacks on the Kosovars.

If the Yugoslavian president gives in now, argues Westendorp, he knows that it will lead to new elections which would spell the end of his reign in Belgrade.

The diplomat sees the recently floated German plan for a stability pact as the key to ensuring peace and security in the region. But he insists that while it should deliver economic reconstruction, the crucial element is restoring democracy. "Without democracy and protection for minority rights there can be no stability in Belgrade and the other capitals of the region," he says.

Westendorp, who took over the post of High Representative from Carl Bildt in 1997, does not try to play down the problems that the NATO action in Kosovo has caused. "Although the situation in Bosnia-Herzegovina had been improving slowly and steadily, Kosovo has been affecting Bosnia in its moves to normalisation", he says.

The most immediate problem has been a new influx of around 40,000 refugees into a country which is already struggling to resettle 800,000 people displaced by the Bosnian war. In addition, Bosnia's trade is being badly hit by sanctions on Yugoslavia, as the Republika Srpska (RS) has lost the only market for its goods such as food products and oil. Bosnia's airspace and airports have also been closed during the air campaign, which is estimated to be costing the country's state-owned air carrier €190,000 a month.

But Westendorp highlights one other effect of the NATO airstrikes: the impact they are having on ethnic Serbs who see their family members and neighbours under siege across the border in Yugoslavia. Hard-line Serbian nationalist politicians, outraged by the Spaniard's dismissal of extremists, have accused Westendorp of "trying to provoke war" in Bosnia and have called for RS to be reunited with the Yugoslavian Republic of Serbia.

But Westendorp points out that there is no appetite among Bosnia's Serbs for the wartime nationalist rhetoric of their politicians.

" The behaviour of the population is amazingly calm and moderate", he maintains. "They are tired of war and know that they must keep out of the politics of Milosevic and Seselj [the leader of the Serbian radical party in RS]. If radical Serbian politicians try to organise demonstrations to protest in front of western offices, only around 250 people turn up."

Nevertheless, Westendorp acknowledges that the present political situation is tense. "The moderate government in RS' capital Banja Luka have been put under pressure by the radicals. They say that they are traitors working for the international community," he explains.

He believes that ordinary Serbs in RS know that if they vote for extremists, the west will not be prepared to provide the economic aid they so badly need in a region still struggling to repair the damage caused by the fighting in the early 1990s. "Bosnia and Republika Srpska are not rich countries - we need support," he says, pointing out that RS has received a very small share of the total aid package for Bosnia-Herzegovina.

In addition, the clamour for economic assistance from the countries neighbouring Kosovo and slow progress in agreeing economic reforms in the multi-state entity have cast doubts over whether a decision on additional international aid for Bosnia can be taken this month.

Westendorp admits that, with the other demands now being made of international bodies, it will be difficult for Bosnia to get the €900 million it is expecting to receive this year as part of the €4.8-billion post-Dayton agreement.

But he believes that Bosnia can weather the instability caused by the Kosovo crisis provided it does not get involved in the conflict. In particular, he dismisses suggestions that any of the 32,000 NATO-led peacekeeping troops based in Bosnia could be sent to Kosovo. "Bosnia-Herzegovina must be kept out of the Kosovo conflict," he insists.

Asked whether there is any chance that NATO's air campaign will lead to the overthrow of Milosevic, Westendorp says moderate Serbian forces can prevail given time. He says that the many more moderate forces in Yugoslavia see the prospect of a stability pact as a valuable prize.

"These forces realise that there is no future for Yugoslavia with Milosevic", he argues, although he admits that the president's grip on power has been strengthened temporarily by the war on Serbia.

Many critics have suggested that the international community's big mistake was to "do business" with Milosevic in 1995, as US envoy Richard Holbrooke famously put it. But Westendorp dismisses this suggestion. "After four years of war in Bosnia, Milosevic came as a relief", he explains.

However, Milosevic should then have responded to the international community's offers of financial aid and an end to the punitive sanctions which have crippled the Yugoslav economy in return for a dialogue on democracy, media freedom and minority rights.

Such a deal was not possible, argues Westendorp, because Milosevic knew that democratisation and the opening up of the economy to competition would mean that the people would get rid of him. The president's hold on power stems as much from his strategic control of key national economic assets as from the web of personal political allies he has in positions of influence.

Westendorp argues that Kosovo must remain within Serbia once there is an end to the fighting. "Independence is not the right solution because of the chain effect on Macedonia, Albania and other countries," he says, adding that the only short term solution is for a protectorate with a peace-keeping force. Once that has been established, the international community can start to move forward through the stability pact.

Westendorp also believes the pact could help other ex-Yugoslavian countries find their way back into the European fold. He believes, for example, that Croatia, which has been denied EU aid because of its poor record in returning Serbian refugees home, could benefit from the plan. "Croatia should be included because apart from Slovenia, Croatia has the most possibility of becoming part of the mainstream of Europe," he says.

Westendorp believes that things could change if post-war President Franjo Tudjman and his party hardliners are voted out in next year's elections. "They are remnants of the nationalistic struggle," he says, adding that many forces in Croatia want to see the country fully integrated into Europe and the west should respond to that, provided Croatia makes a big effort on the return of refugees once the Kosovo conflict is over.

In the final analysis, Westendorp is confident that peace can return to the Balkans. "Milosevic is like a mirage. He will disappear," he says. "We know that the only long term solution is the full democratisation of Serbia."

Major feature and interview with Carlos Westendorp, the EU's High Representative in Kosovo.