EU cavalry arrives too late for Kosovo

Date: 04/03/1999

As the EU keeps up diplomatic pressure for a peace deal in Kosovo, work is continuing behind the scenes to create a common defence policy. But progress is painfully slow. Simon Taylor reports

As this month's deadline for the Serbs and the Kosovo Albanians to strike a lasting peace deal looms, the EU faces the biggest test of its political credibility since the Bosnian war.

The international community is waiting to see whether it can match the diplomatic might of the US and prevent a new conflagration on its southern flank.

But moves to give Europe the military muscle it needs to put pressure on warring parties such as those in the Kosovan conflict are still stuck on the starting block, delayed by institutional wrangles and national rivalries over plum EU jobs.

The 1995 Dayton peace accord, hammered out on the windy Ohio airbase thanks to the efforts of pugnacious US special envoy Richard Holbrooke, has clearly served as a model for the peace talks in Kosovo.

The decision to hold the talks in the Parisian suburb of Rambouillet was an attempt by the Europeans to retake the initiative in solving regional conflicts and refute Holbrooke's famous insult that Europe was "sleeping" through international crises.

But what delivered a credible deal in Dayton was the awareness that the western powers were prepared to deploy 60,000 NATO troops on the ground to ensure that any peace deal worked and did not deteriorate into renewed fighting.

In the case of Kosovo, US President Bill Clinton's refusal to put US troops at risk in the province has allowed Yugoslav President Slobodan Milosevic to exploit the international community's divisions and resist pressure for a multinational peacekeeping presence.

It is, of course, by no means certain that Milosevic would have agreed to a non-NATO-led presence on the ground even if one were available. Perhaps even more importantly, there are serious doubts over whether NATO countries are prepared to bomb Serbian military targets given the Kosovo Liberation Army's refusal to sign up to a deal which did not guarantee the Kosovans full independence from Belgrade.

But as Clinton himself said at a press conference in Washington last week, the prospect of an independent European military force has moved closer since Dayton, raising hopes that Europe could act independently of the US in situations where American squeamishness is a bar to effective action.

"We want Europe to assume more of its own defence," he said. "I think we are moving toward more of an independent European force, but supported by the United States because we have a very large stake in anything that upsets the stability of central Europe."

However, despite Clinton's apparent optimism, very little concrete progress has been made towards giving Europe the means to act independently of NATO.

Last December, UK Prime Minister Tony Blair and French President Jacques Chirac agreed a declaration on Europe's future defence policy which stated: "The Union must have the capacity for autonomous action, backed up by credible military forces, the means to decide to use them, and a readiness to do so, in order to respond to international crises."

The St Malo initiative was welcomed by other EU governments, which recognised that Blair had slaughtered a British sacred cow by offering to put his country's soldiers at the disposal of the Union.

But since then, little has been achieved and tangible steps towards enabling the EU to react militarily to regional conflicts are still at least six months away.

Although Germany should be running the show as the current holder of the EU presidency, Union officials say that Bonn and other Union governments are watching to see how much progress the British and French can make.

German officials say they plan to put the issue on the agenda for an informal meeting of foreign ministers in Rheinhartshausen next weekend (13-14 March), which takes place just before the Kosovo talks are due to resume, with the aim of following this up with concrete proposals at the summit of EU leaders at Cologne in June.

The other crucial event for the future of any European defence strategy is the NATO summit in Washington to celebrate the alliance's 50th anniversary in April, at which new members Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic will be welcomed into the fold.

Approval from the Union's NATO partners for any initiatives outside the alliance will be crucial because, as defence analysts are quick to point out, only the US has the equipment needed to react quickly to international crises. The best illustration of this is the long-range transport aircraft which are crucial to getting troops into conflict zones at short notice.

Discussions on a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) are scheduled for the Washington meeting, which is expected to focus on the key question of the degree of autonomy any European structure could have within NATO.

As a recent report by security analysts at the British American Security Information Council points out, "for the US, ESDI poses something of a dilemma". It adds: "While there is a desire to encourage a greater defence effort by European members of NATO, the US does not wish to see Europe operating independently, particularly in the Middle East."

US Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has already indicated that Washington would oppose any move to give the Europeans too much autonomy under the ESDI. "Any initiative must avoid pre-empting alliance decision-making by de-linking ESDI from NATO," she warned in December.

German Defence Minister Rudolf Scharping said recently that he expected the Washington summit to give NATO's Union members a clear idea of where to go next in their efforts to create a complementary structure to the alliance. Officials say these signals will set the parameters of the EU's internal debate.

But even taking into account the need for European governments to win American support for any plans to beef up the EU's ability to manage local conflicts, the Union is making slow progress in tightening up the mechanisms and decision-making structures which will be essential to respond rapidly to future Kosovos and Bosnias.

The role of the new High Representative for a Common Foreign and Security Policy will be central in translating the EU's reaction to conflicts into action, but officials do not expect the first 'Mr or Mrs CFSP' to be appointed until June as part of a horse-trading session between governments to share out top jobs including the presidency of the European Commission. This means that the new foreign policy supremo will not become effective until the end of this year at the earliest.

The delay could also interfere with some of the options suggested for moving towards a common EU defence policy.

Scharping has proposed merging the existing 28-member Western European Union (WEU) into the EU and recently floated the idea that the High Representative should take over the duties of the WEU's secretary-general, whose term of office expires in November.

So far, however, this proposal has received a very lukewarm response, with critics pointing to the prohibitive workload which would face the holder of the combined post and stressing the need to keep the EU's political and military wings separate.

All this comes on top of the problems of integrating the WEU into the EU caused by the fact that Norway, Iceland and Turkey are members of the former but not the latter.

Despite all the political and administrative difficulties involved in beefing up the EU's ability to deal with security and defence issues, officials point out that the Union is closer to strengthening its response to crises than at any time in the last ten years, not least because of the UK's willingness to take the lead.

While the EU will still have to rely on the US and NATO to tackle the Kosovo crisis in the short term, the next 12 months could see it going some way towards shedding its image as the international community's 'political pygmy'.

Yet the nagging doubt remains that whatever the EU agrees, it will never be able to match the awesome clout of the Americans on the world stage, whose influence stems from a combination of military, economic and cultural power.

As one senior EU diplomat put it: "It is easier for Milosevic to tell Bildt to get lost than Richard Holbrooke."

Major feature. As the EU keeps up diplomatic pressure for a peace deal in Kosovo, work is continuing behind the scenes to create a common defence policy. But progress is painfully slow to create a European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI).