Greece charts a lonely course

Date: 29/05/1997

THE Greeks have done it again.

On the brink of the most promising talks with Turkey in months, Athens had a sudden change of heart and refused to attend a 'friendly' brain-storming session with Ankara.

A Dutch presidency proposal for a meeting of 'wise men', with two academics or diplomats from each side, to draft some suggestions for the mid-June EU summit at Amsterdam was a “mistake”, according to Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos, and could not go ahead this month.

The origin of this sudden rejection lay with 32 members of the Greek Socialist Party PASOK, who wrote to Prime Minister Costas Simitis warning that talks which could stray into areas of sovereignty might set a dangerous precedent.

The missive struck home and some very high-level brakes were applied. The experts have instead been reduced to exchanging letters via the Dutch presidency (in secret) and are unlikely to meet until well after Amsterdam, if at all.

Turkish diplomats claim that the behaviour of their “friends” - as they always refer to the Greeks - is rather puzzling, to say the least.

Given that the committee was to have been little more than a forum for discussion between academics and diplomats, whose recommendations would have bound no one to anything, they maintain that it is hard to see where Greece's objections lie. For its part, Ankara has declared itself perfectly willing to hold the meeting under any terms the Dutch suggest.

In the rest of the European Union, the news that the encounter would not, after all, take place caused scarcely a ripple. With the continent's attention fixed upon Union reform and the run-up to economic and monetary union, this latest episode of Balkan animosity did not even warrant an EU presidency statement.

Washington also remained silent (despite the fact that the US administration reportedly regards the committee as “a really great idea”), although it has been continuing to apply pressure for closer EU-Turkey ties from behind the scenes.

Privately, officials played down the significance of the backtrack. “In this job, you save disappointment for your private life,” said one Dutch diplomat involved in the talks when he was asked if the news came as a blow.

The reason for this silence appears to boil down to one underlying assumption: if the Greeks insist on shooting themselves in the foot, there is little anyone can do about it.

However, there is also another element to this attitude, mentioned explicitly by no one but 'understood' between northern member states: that Greece is a peripheral EU member in more than just geography and so should be treated as such.

One can hear the whispers at any bar where EU fonctionnaires gather in Brussels. “Greece ... what a mistake it was to let it in. It causes nothing but trouble,” they mutter.

Greek diplomats are quick to remind those tempted into taking up this line of argument that they are making a grave mistake.

Apart from the country's obvious historic legacy, a crucial line still exists where Greece meets Turkey.

It may not be the ineradicable barrier suggested by a recent conference of European Christian Democrats, and certainly it is not an obstacle to trade and cooperation, but it is nevertheless a symbolic division firmly entrenched in the European and eastern psyche for 1,000 years.

To put the tensions which surround that line down to typical Balkan bickering is to forget a millennium of history lessons, Greek diplomats are quick to remind anyone who will listen. World wars have been sparked by the region's disputes and matters remain far from settled.

They also argue that those who condemn the country's behaviour might also learn some tolerance from the experience of more recent politics.

Supporters maintain that Greece, a country still struggling to overcome the legacy of an externally supported military dictatorship, might well be forgiven for viewing the solutions proscribed for it by the outside world with some caution.

It might also be forgiven for some trepidation in the face of a regional superpower, bristling with weapons it is apparently not afraid to use, which has promised to go to war over a few kilometres of sea.

And it might well also be forgiven for taking its own line given the conspicuous lack of political support offered by its most natural allies.

Last July, with Greece and Turkey on the brink of war over some barren Aegean rocks, the EU dutifully declared that Turkey should respect its members' sovereignty, renounce aggression and take up disputes in the International Court of Justice.

One year on, however, Ankara has not actively complied with any of these conditions. Yet a recent letter to The Hague from Turkey's Foreign Minister Tansu Ciller was enough to convince 14 EU member states that things were on track.

They all now advocate a resumption of cooperative diplomacy, backed by hard cash.

Furthermore, when Greece begged to differ at a meeting of EU foreign ministers in Noordwijk in March (and opposed funding due to Turkey under a customs union), the rest of the Union treated it like a spoilt child.

This is not to say that Turkey should be thrust out into the cold.

Aside from the clear trade advantages of a secular and western-oriented Ankara, the existence of such a powerful and secular Arab ally is of huge geo-political importance - as both Washington and (now) the EU are quick to stress.

Islamic Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan's struggle against the military, and his uneasy alliance with Tansu Ciller, clearly demonstrate the fragility of Turkish democracy.

If it collapsed, the effects would be felt throughout the Middle East and the former Soviet Asiatic republics.

Nevertheless, the threat posed by Turkey to an EU member is unambiguous - Ankara says openly that should Greece extend its maritime frontiers from six to 12 kilometres, as it is entitled to do under international law, Turkey would consider the move as an act of war.

Furthermore, NATO refused in the 1980s to promise Greece protection should it be attacked by 'any state' - implying a NATO member - and the Western European Union (WEU) specifically waived a provision pledging such mutual protection in Greece's case in 1992.

Ankara has consistently failed to go to the international court in The Hague to discuss the Aegean question. “We are considering other alternatives,” said a spokesman for Turkey's mission to the EU. Considering this, and the fact that Turkish troops remain firmly entrenched in Cyprus, it seems hardly surprising that Athens feels vulnerable.

At a meeting between Turkish junior Foreign Minister Onur Oymen and alternate Greek Foreign Minister George Papandreou earlier this week, Oymen warned his counterpart: “You cannot solve your problems with Turkey by means of international law, by means of veto and embargo.”

But there is little else, it appears, for Greece to use as leverage. Its diplomats are consequently calling for some understanding from an apparently unsympathetic Union.

“We really do not want to be railroaded into any premature negotiations,” said a spokesman for the country's mission to the European Union. “This is a very important issue for us.”