German politics and the EU

How the French referendum may play into German politics

IT MAY seem a stretch to compare the election in North Rhine-Westphalia to the French vote on the EU constitution. Yet in both cases, voters said no not only to a regional coalition or a treaty, but also to national leaders. The fallout was rapid: a snap general election in Germany, a new government in France. The two votes have also exposed tensions inside two powerful partnerships: the one between the Social Democrats (SPD) and Greens inside Germany, and the one between France and Germany inside the EU.

When “red-green”, as the SPD/Green coalition is known, came to power in 1998, it was seen as a natural alliance that could end years of political stagnation. In its first term, the coalition did much to modernise Germany, with laws on citizenship and same-sex partnerships. Yet by its second term in 2002, the coalition was scrambling for joint projects. As the economic and political outlook deteriorated, Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and a spooked SPD came to set the agenda, resisting such Green projects as anti-discrimination and freedom of information laws.

Predictably, things have gone further downhill after Mr Schroder's decision to call for early elections. The two parties will campaign separately. Last week, the coalition almost collapsed after a quarrel over corporate-tax cuts and how to precipitate the elections (Mr Schroder is likely to ask his ministers, most of whom are members of parliament, not to participate in a vote of confidence on July 1st).

As for Franco-German relations, they are running through a similar rough patch. After getting off to a bad start, Mr Schroder and France's Jacques Chirac moved ever closer: joint opposition to the Iraq war, surprise deals on farm subsidies and the EU constitution, new efforts to co-ordinate domestic and EU policies to mark the 40th anniversary, in January 2003, of the bilateral Elysee treaty. There was even, for a time, heady talk of a Franco-German union, including a single foreign policy.

Yet the more the two leaders got along, the weaker the Franco-German engine of the EU became. Such joint initiatives as weakening the stability and growth pact are seen by smaller member states as self-interested, not as a search for compromises acceptable to all. In Berlin, there is a growing feeling that the two countries have become too close for comfort. It is also becoming understood that, in a club of 25, Franco-German agreement is no longer sufficient for the EU to move ahead. That is clearer still after France's loud non to the constitution.

The French vote and the looming German election could lead to a rebalancing of German foreign policy. Mr Schroder will not break with his friend, Mr Chirac: they talked after the referendum, and the chancellor declared that the vote did not spell the end of the Franco-German partnership. Yet, for the first time in decades, France and Germany, which ratified the constitution two days before the French vote, are on separate European tracks. Ideas of a core Europe or a Franco-German union now seem all but dead.

In any case, Angela Merkel, who was this week officially nominated as the chancellor-candidate for the opposition, led by the Christian Democrats (CDU), and is now the favourite to win the election in September, is sure to adjust foreign policy. She is indisputably more Atlanticist and liberal than Mr Schroder; indeed, she shares many views with Nicolas Sarkozy, a rival and possible successor to Mr Chirac.

Are the two couples doomed to irreconcilable differences? No, because in neither case is there much alternative. Although the SPD muses about a grand coalition with the CDU, this seems unlikely. Its best hope of power still lies with its linkage to the Greens. Similarly, although some in the opposition toy with the idea of other EU alliances - eg, with Britain - they will find that, if Germany wants to do anything in the EU, it always needs France. Ms Merkel would have to accept that public opinion favours close relations with France.

Still, the bickering is likely to have salutary effects. Going their separate ways, if only temporarily, will allow the SPD and Greens to reaffirm their identity before getting back together. And a cooled-off Franco-German engine, with different people at the wheel, may seem less threatening to other EU members and to America. As with human couples, political marriages are shaken by traumatic events but often endure despite them.