Turkey and the European Union. The unwelcome guests

Despite doubts and grumbles around Europe, next week's EU summit will say yes to the opening of membership talks with Turkey

YOU might be forgiven for assuming that, when European Union leaders meet in Brussels next week, they will have little to say on the main item on their agenda: Turkey's bid to join the EU. The European Commission has recommended the opening of membership talks next year, and most EU leaders are in favour. Yet discussion could still be acrimonious.

The first issue will be when to start the talks. The Turks want a date early in 2005. What they will probably get is a promise of a start some time in the second half of 2005. The reason is that the French referendum on the EU constitution could be in May, and the government is desperate to avoid Turkey clouding the debate. A second argument will be whether to accede to those who want to state explicitly that talks may not end in membership, but instead in a “privileged partnership”. The betting is that no such reference will appear in the summit's conclusions.

Turko-sceptics may be thrown other bones, including a “trigger mechanism” providing that negotiations can be suspended if Turkish human-rights reforms go into reverse. There will be debate too about whether to suggest that membership might include permanent exceptions from normal EU laws, especially on free movement of people. Yet the subject of permanent derogations is also unlikely to feature in the conclusions.

Lurking behind these questions is the fear that Cyprus, a new EU member, could sabotage the whole deal. The official position of the (Greek-Cypriot) government is that unless Turkey recognises it, it might veto the opening of talks. But the Cypriot government, already in bad odour because it encouraged the Greek-Cypriot rejection of the UN's unification plan in April, will come under huge pressure not to cast its veto now.

Other new members are largely favourable to Turkey. Poland has misgivings, but is now keener as a way of promoting the admissibility of Ukraine. Poles also remember that throughout the 19th century the Ottoman empire refused to recognise their country's elimination. At diplomatic functions, the sultan would repeatedly query, “Where is the Polish ambassador?”

Of the rest, Britain, Scandinavia, Italy and the Iberian duo are essentially on Turkey's side. The main nervousness is to be found in France, Germany, Austria and the Netherlands. In France, President Jacques Chirac's enthusiasm for Turkish entry is out of tune with his people and his party. He has long argued that Turkey has “a European vocation”, and yet polls show some 75% of the French against Turkish entry. France's ruling UMP party is against, as is Nicolas Sarkozy, its freshly elected boss.

The main French objection is that Turkey is big, poor and, above all, Muslim. The French fear not only Turkish workers, but also a louder voice for Islam. France already has Europe's biggest Muslim population, and it is finding it hard to reconcile its model of integration, which relies on a strict separation of religion and state, with demands by French Muslims for religious expression within public institutions. If France has trouble accommodating a big Muslim population, some ask, how can Europe manage a whole country?

The other French objection concerns the changing nature of Europe. The creation of ever-closer union was once a clear Franco-German project. But the EU is becoming a looser entity, with limited political ambition, where English prevails over French. Some see Turkey's admission as a final confirmation of this trend. Mr Chirac has given some ground, promising a referendum on Turkish entry in 10-15 years' time. In his recent visit to Germany, he also hinted at a “third way”: although affirming that “Germany and France share the same objective: to bring Turkey into the European Union”, he also spoke of creating “a sufficiently strong link” with Turkey, short of full membership, if the talks failed.

In Germany, Turkish entry into the EU is even more sensitive than elsewhere. Yet apart from the occasional populist outburst, the debate has so far been surprisingly rational - and almost as many Germans are for full Turkish membership as are against it. One might have expected Chancellor Gerhard Schroder and, even more so, his foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, to be hesitant. But the threat of international terrorism has changed their tune. “If we succeed in integrating an Islamic country, this would tremendously increase our security,” says Mr Schroder, adding that it would be inconceivable for the EU to shut the door after having made promises to Turkey for more than 40 years.

Yet the opposition Christian Democrats (CDU) argue that, even if Turkey is ready for full membership, the EU is not, either culturally or politically. “A Europe with Turkey won't be a Europe of deep integration,” Angela Merkel, the CDU leader, told her party's annual congress this week. Ms Merkel is the strongest exponent of the notion of a “privileged partnership”, and she is still hoping to get a reference to it inserted into the summit's conclusions, by pushing a fellow-conservative, Wolfgang Schussel, Austria's chancellor, to back it. His government supports the opening of negotiations with Turkey, but much of domestic opinion in Austria is hostile.

It is not lost on Germany's politicians that Germans with Turkish roots are a growing constituency, and one in which the governing Social Democrats are said to have a two-thirds majority. Even Ms Merkel is not insensitive: were she to become chancellor in 2006, she would not jump off the train after the negotiations have begun. But she cannot always resist populist temptations: for a few days in October, she toyed with the idea of organising a petition against full EU membership for Turkey. And the debate in Germany on Turkey's eventual membership could still turn ugly in future. Indeed, it is likely to flare up every time a decision on Turkey has to be taken in Brussels, particularly if it coincides with one of the endless number of electoral campaigns in Germany.

Presiding over next week's summit will be the Dutch prime minister, Jan Peter Balkenende. His task will be the more delicate as opinion in his country, never too keen on Turkish entry, has turned strongly against, largely as a result of the turmoil over Islam that followed the murder of Theo Van Gogh last month. Mr Balkenende's party, the Christian Democrats, is divided; so is its Liberal (VVD) coalition partner. The outgoing Dutch European commissioner and former VVD leader, Frits Bolkestein, once said that Turkish accession might mean that the repulsion of Ottoman forces from the gates of Vienna in 1683 had been in vain. Yet the Dutch EU presidency is still likely to end by sponsoring the opening of membership talks with Turkey, for all that.