Charlemagne. Turkish tales

Would Turkish membership of the EU really suit America?

WHEN George Bush stood on the banks of the Bosporus in June and called on the European Union to admit Turkey as a member, the European reaction was chilly. The EU must decide by December whether to open negotiations with Turkey, and it is edging towards saying yes. But the issue is sensitive in Europe, and pressure from the United States is not appreciated. Jacques Chirac, the French president, spoke for many of his colleagues when he said that the decision was none of America's business.

The Americans, however, think they have a direct interest in supporting Turkey's bid. David Phillips of the Council on Foreign Relations in New York sums up this view when he writes in the latest edition of Foreign Affairs that “EU membership would anchor Turkey in the West, fortify it as a firewall against terrorism and help make it a model of democracy for the Muslim world.” Such conventional wisdom often carries with it another not-so-hidden assumption: that, rather as with the ten central European countries that have just joined the EU, Turkey would bolster pro-American sentiment within the EU, counteracting those older countries, notably France, that have flirted with creating a counterweight to America.

But the idea that Turkey would stiffen pro-Americanism in Europe could well prove wrong. A poll for the German Marshall Fund of the United States, released on September 9th, probes attitudes to America in nine members of the EU (including Britain, France and Germany), as well as in Turkey. Asked to rate the warmth of their feelings towards the United States on a scale of 1-100, the nine existing members produced an average of 55. Turkey, by contrast, was a distinctly chilly 28, markedly more antagonistic than France's 51.

Hostility towards American foreign policy is also deeper in Turkey than in most of the existing European Union. Some 62% of Turks say they “disapprove very much” of the Bush administration's foreign policy, compared with 40% in the nine EU members and 35% of Americans. Turks are also more hostile to Israel than are other Europeans, even though their country is a close ally of Israel's. Asked whether America and the European Union have “enough common values to be able to co-operate on international problems”, 60% of the EU nine's citizens answer in the affirmative, but only 27% of Turks do.

Opinion polls are a mere snapshot, of course, and this one reflects the strong emotions aroused among Muslims everywhere over the past two years by events in Palestine and Iraq, and also Turkish fears that the overthrow of Saddam Hussein has encouraged Kurdish separatism. In time such fears may fade, and Turks could resume their role as faithful supporters of America. But it is at least possible that EU membership might push Turkey the other way instead.

The country's strategic alliance with the United States is the traditional policy of its secular, military elite, who have seen NATO membership as a crucial expression of Turkey's western orientation. But membership of the EU might provide an alternative expression of this policy, making NATO and the United States less important, even to Turkish generals. In any case, the democratising reforms required as a condition of EU membership are weakening the influence of the Turkish armed forces and increasing the importance of public opinion - a fact that was underlined when the Turkish parliament refused to allow America to invade Iraq from the country's soil in 2003.

American policymakers are doubtless aware of these risks. They are anyway more interested in the potential prizes that they believe would be offered by Turkish membership of the EU: the creation of that “firewall against terrorism” and “model of democracy for the Muslim world”. But even these benefits might not materialise. The Turks themselves are not convinced. When the German Marshall Fund asked if Turkish membership of the EU was desirable because it would “strengthen moderate Islam as a model in the Muslim world”, only 8% of Turks agreed. After all, one of the reasons why the Turks are keen on EU membership is precisely to prove that they are different from the Arab world. Nor are Arab countries, many of which broke free from the Ottoman empire, altogether likely to regard Turkey as a model for their own development.

Foot-soldiers for a superpower?

Just as the hopes that the Americans place in Turkish membership of the EU may be exaggerated, so some European fears may be misplaced. For many people, these revolve round a fear of immigration, of admitting such a large country and of making Europe more Islamic - as Frits Bolkestein, the Dutch commissioner, said this week. But there is also a strategic consideration. Michel Rocard, a former prime minister of France who is a passionate advocate of Turkish membership, has argued that the Franco-German elite are reluctant to let Turkey into the EU because they fear it would imperil the “Carolingian dream” of creating a new European superpower, as powerful as the United States. The reasoning is that a European Union that contained Turkey would simply be too diverse ever to act coherently on the world stage.

Certainly, Turkey would not be the most malleable of partners. It is a country with a strong and well-defined sense of its own self-interest, which it would be unlikely to want to submerge in any post-modern mush cooked up in Brussels. On the other hand, Turkey would bring considerable strategic assets to the table. It has knowledge and experience of dealing with its neighbours in one of the most dangerous parts of the world. And, unlike all other new or prospective members of the EU, it has a large army. One flaw in the EU's dreams of global influence is its lack of military punch. Turkey's armed forces, over half a million strong, are much bigger than France's, Germany's or Britain's. French global ambitions, bolstered by Turkish troops: now that could be an interesting combination.

Commentary feature. Would Turkish membership of the EU really suit the United States?