Russia’s presidential election: Sliding to victory

Date: 13/03/04

Will Vladimir Putin's new mandate make him dizzy with success?

THE election is not until March 14th, but Vladimir Putin's second term has already begun. Although there are signs that his firing of Mikhail Kasyanov, the prime minister, nearly three weeks ago was not premeditated - notably the six-day hiatus before he named a successor - Mr Putin has seized the opportunity. This week he appointed a radically restructured new government, which suggests that he will push hard in his second term for reforms that were stalled in the first.

Jumping the gun is a luxury he can allow himself. Polls give him between 70% and 80% of the vote. Each of his opponents has about the same low-single-figure ratings as when the month-long campaign officially began. Mr Putin is helped by pliant state-owned television networks, which feature the president heavily in newscasts and aired his entire 29-minute speech to campaign workers. Last week Ivan Rybkin, who became Mr Putin's best-known challenger after a surrealistic four-day disappearance in February, pulled out.

The only risk for the president is that, with the election not only predictable but - as the government reshuffle this week made clear - irrelevant, not enough people will vote. The turnout could then fall below the 50% legal minimum, which would mean a fresh election with new candidates. The parliamentary election in December, which featured genuine competition, pulled in just 56%. Far-flung local authorities have been desperately getting the vote out, with everything from prizes for bringing friends to register to punishments for those who shirk their civic duty. Assuming that he wins, buys or steals enough votes to get past the 50% threshold, Mr Putin will be ready to forge ahead. His new government has investors and economists excited. It has 17 ministers instead of the previous 30, abolishes five of the six deputy prime ministers, and merges several groups of ministries to streamline work on the main policy areas. The new conglomerates include transport, railways and communications; energy, atomic energy, industry and construction; and economic development and trade, which may also absorb several other offices. A new divide between ministries that set policy, services such as regulators that enforce it, and agencies that do such things as issue licences and manage federal property, is meant to reduce conflicts of interest.

Equally striking are the names at the top. German Gref, one of the government's main reformers and previously economic-development minister, keeps his job, but with far wider powers. So does another economic liberal, Alexei Kudrin, the finance minister, who takes the tax under his thumb too. Yet another, Alexander Zhukov, becomes deputy prime minister and overseer of economic policy as a whole. Viktor Khristenko, in charge of energy, will be more likely than his predecessor to tackle the tricky overhaul of the state gas monopoly, Gazprom. And Dmitry Kozak, one of the architects of Mr Putin's plans for slimming the bureaucracy will be in charge of carrying them out, as the cabinet's chief of staff.

What is encouraging is that the other elite clan, the former military and intelligence people known as the siloviki, do not feature in this group. That will reassure investors scared by the attack on Yukos, one of Russia's main oil companies, which was thought to be orchestrated by certain siloviki with the president's approval. However, as usual Mr Putin has kept his balance: the siloviki still run the obvious ministries, such as defence, foreign affairs, internal affairs and justice. And though Mikhail Fradkov, the unassuming, hitherto almost unknown prime minister, is likely to obey Mr Putin, he appears to have silovik connections (witness a gap in his official biography in 1972-73, when some think he may have been trained at the KGB academy before a posting to India).

With the Duma dominated by the pro-Kremlin United Russia party, the result, comments Roland Nash of Renaissance Capital, a Moscow-based investment bank, is “a political machine where policy dreamed up at the dacha over the weekend can be signed into law by close of play on Friday.” The first exercise of this newfound power is expected soon: administrative reforms and some changes to the tax code, on which Mr Kasyanov had been dragging his feet. The bosses of the big natural-resources firms, whose main government ally was Mr Kasyanov, are braced for higher taxes and more meddling in their affairs. Further plans, as set out by Mr Gref in December, include clearer property rights, more money for education and housing, and investment incentives to reduce dependence on natural resources.

But the whole system retains two glaring weaknesses. The first lies in the difference between legislation and implementation. Will super-ministries be any better than single ones grouped under deputy prime ministers? Will bureaucrats charged with eliminating their cosy and corrupt systems of control jump to orders? Will money for social services be siphoned off? How will new laws be enforced without a more honest judiciary? There is no sign of a break in the deadlock over Mr Putin's plans to overhaul the bloated and cash-starved armed forces, which generals have resisted; but the defence minister, Sergei Ivanov, is keeping his job.

The second drawback is that there are no counterweights to the president's power. Bad laws can get through as easily as good ones; if they do, there will be little protest either in parliament or, given the Kremlin's control of the media, in public. One example is changes to the criminal code, hastily passed in the run-up to the Duma election, that cut out a provision allowing the confiscation of stolen property. The old law was too tough, but the new one may make crime-fighting harder. Without public debate to root out such ill-conceived laws, they could build up like genetic mutations, sickening Mr Putin's much-hoped-for superstate.

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