America should learn from Europe

Date: 11/09/03

By Dana Spinant

AMERICAN troops in Iraq could learn from their European allies and adopt a more 'softly-softly' approach towards the local population, to build trust and curb the number of casualties.

The security situation may have deteriorated in recent weeks in the southern part of the country, but one thing that hasn't changed is the sight of British soldiers wearing their berets. Whenever they can, the 'Tommies' remove their helmets and replace them with their regimental headgear.

Immediately after taking Basrah in April, they started to soften their image, so as to be perceived as a force to ensure security rather than conquering soldiers.

The Americans have failed to carry out a similar transformation. It would be too simplistic to say this explains why the US has suffered a higher number of fatalities from hostile action (69 troops killed since the official end of the war, on 1 May, as opposed to 11 for the British).

However, the European military view is that positive interaction with the civilians is crucial for winning the peace. The British approach has caught on with European allies such as the Italians, Romanians, Czechs and Danes. (Troops from the latter two are under UK command in Iraq.)

The American troops have, beyond doubt, a more difficult region to control, as central Iraq, the so-called Sunni triangle, is Saddam Hussein's old power base. By contrast, the UK occupation sector, comprising two provinces, is mainly populated by Shia Muslims. The Shia, who make up a majority in Iraq, have long been persecuted by Saddam and his ruling Sunni elite.

However, the support of the population was not to be taken for granted by the British forces when they entered Basrah last March. The Shias wanted to get rid of Saddam, "but they did not want a foreign occupier", Nawfal Al-Obied, a 29-year old journalist from Basrah says. The local population had to be won over.

The UK troops marked the passage from war to peacekeeping by adopting a more approachable and open posture. These signals are of crucial importance, as they suggest the soldiers do not see the population as a threat, and that they are less of a threat themselves.

For Sergeant Major Simon Ellis, of the Multinational Division (South East), the decades-long British experience with urban warfare in Northern Ireland is instrumental in present peacekeeping strategies and training. "We learned from Northern Ireland that it is very important to give an approachable and friendly image to the population," Ellis said.

In order to capture the former regime's loyalists, the occupying troops need to win the trust of the civilians - popular resentment against them would help the paramilitary fighters gain new recruits.

UK officers in Basrah opine that the Americans failed to soften their image. "The classical picture of an American in Iraq is still the heavily-armed GI - impressive soldiers, but they look like Robocops. They wear helmets, body armour and heavy weaponseverywhere," an officer serving with Basrah-based 19 Mechanized Brigade commented.

"Even when they walk on the streets of Kuwait City, the friendliest place for them in the region, they still keep their helmet and body armour."

Even in Basrah, the city most entitled to celebrate the removal of Saddam Hussein after a decade-long repression following the uprising of the Shia against the dictator, people differentiate between the British and the Americans. "We welcome the British, but we don't trust the Americans," Allah, an interpreter working with the Kings' Regiment said.

The high number of casualties in the war and after the end of direct hostilities explains the tougher posture of the American soldiers. But troops in Basrah say that this is a vicious circle, as heavy tactics generate hostility and, therefore, risk for soldiers.

The British "have burned their fingers too", as Nawfal Al-Obied puts it: six Royal Military Police were executed on 24 June in a police station at Al Majar al Kabir by an infuriated mob. Another three soldiers from the same regiment were killed in Basrah when their civilian vehicle was strafed by a gunman on 23 August.

These events were unexpected given that the British operate in a 'friendly' Shia zone. In the case of Al Majar, local observers say heavy-handed treatment by some British soldiers built resentment against the troops. Tension started to mount as parachute troops - crack forces in the British army - searched houses for weapons "the tough way", as one officer put it.

The elite soldiers were shouting through closed doors and using dogs to search the homes for drugs. Nawfal says that this revolted the locals. "Entering someone's house with dogs that snoop everywhere, scare women and children - this is seen as being very aggressive by people here," he said.

The fury stirred by the paratroopers' tactics saw a mob encircle a police station where six other British soldiers had arrived to begin training local policemen. They were shot dead before they were able to call for help.

"People are already a bit tense when heavily armed troops enter their villages. They are also very attached to their weapons: every family head has to have weapons to protect his family.

"Searching for weapons is very sensitive. But the way they did it was the last straw. Tension mounted very quickly, things can go very fast here," Nawfal added.

According to military analysts, this example shows that elite troops are not the best suited to act in peacekeeping actions. Professor Martin Edmonds, director of the Centre for Defence and International Security Studies at the University of Lancaster, wrote, in an article published in April in Iraq Crisis Bulletin, that "when elite forces are used, people like the Royal Marines and the Parachute Regiment, who tend to push the door down and then ask questions afterward, tend to generate a resentment among the civil community and resistance".

The paras completed their tour in Iraq soon after the Al Majar tragedy. The area they patrolled is now the responsibility of the King's Own Scottish Borderers. Locals are now more inclined to give information about Saddam's guerrillas, or organized crime. One reason for this is that the soldiers appear more approachable.

In contrast, specialists say the American troops in Iraq carry a big stick, but fail to accompany it with a velvet glove. They point to the lack of adequate training for US soldiers involved in peacekeeping, as opposed to their European counterparts.

Dan Goure, vice-president of the Lexington Institute, a Washington-based think-tank, says policing urban areas, which is the number-one task in Iraq, is not something for which American troops have been specifically trained.

"We train largely to take over the terrain. We don't typically train our soldiers for the post-seizure, if you will, policing," he told Iraq Crisis Bulletin.

Goure points out the US soldiers' lack of experience and training first became obvious during the Balkan peacekeeping operations in the mid-1990s. When out on patrol, they too often hid behind their armour, he says.

In addition, the American troops in Iraq have an further enemy in comparison to their British fellows: exhaustion. Most have been in Iraq since the beginning of the war in March (some have actually been in the Gulf region for more than a year now).

They fought the war, then faced an extremely hot summer. Now they are desperate to go home.

By contrast, the British troops have been rotated. After the end of hostilities, the soldiers who fought the war were quickly replaced with new ones, who are less tense in their dealings with the locals, given that they had not taken part in the combat.

The difference is considerable: in such a volatile environment, where the enemy is often not clearly identifiable, cool-headed soldiers and edgy and tired troops are as different as peace and war.

Part of a special feature on Iraq.